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Philosophical basis for ethical treatment of animals
VRANKA, Matouš
The thesis deals with the conditions for rational thinking of the basic level of the ethical approach to non-human reality, especially to animals. The first part describes the concept of being/existence as discussed by three important scholastic teachings (Thomas Aquinas, Ian Duns Scotus and Frantisek Suárez), as well as the development of thinking about the good and the First Cause. In the second part, the issue of Hume's thesis and its possible overcoming through the thesis of supervenience is mentioned. Subsequently, knowledge from the metaphysical part is used as the basis for the formulation of a basic ethical attitude towards animals.
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Two Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality. A Contribution to Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Rabas, Martin ; Němec, Václav (advisor) ; Špinka, Štěpán (referee)
in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...
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Dunamis and Energeia: A Contribution to Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Rabas, Martin ; Němec, Václav (advisor) ; Špinka, Štěpán (referee)
in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2 and partly 6 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...
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Two Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality. A Contribution to Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics
Rabas, Martin ; Němec, Václav (advisor) ; Špinka, Štěpán (referee)
in English: In the first half of the book Theta of his Metaphysics, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a property of a being. In this sense, dunamis is primarily a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other, thereby exercising itself in its energeia. In the second half of the book, Aristotle discusses dunamis as a way of being. In this sense, a being is dunamei another thing and in the course of its becoming that thing it changes into being energeiai. The aim of the present thesis is to offer an interpretation of the concepts of dunamis and energeia as they appear in the chapters 1, 2, 6 and partly 7 of the book Theta. The first question is how the concepts of dunamis and energeia in both parts fit together. The problem is posed as follows: Are dunamis in the sense of a principle of change and dunamis as a way of being mutually dependent? Are energeia as change and being energeiai related? Are they not, in fact, two relatively independent philosophical concepts, relative to whether being is regarded from the point of view of physics, respectively metaphysics? Based on the interpretation of Aristotle's statements, the thesis aims to argue that Aristotle starts his exposition with the analysis of dunamis in the sense of a principle of change precisely in order to show the...
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Truthness in Terms of Gazing and Exposure
Jahoda, Lukáš ; Kouba, Pavel (advisor) ; Ritter, Martin (referee)
The meaning of this work is an explanation of Heideggers notion of the truth from the early fundamental ontology, demonstration of its limits and the interpretation of its intensification in the concept of the truth from the texts Vom Wessen der Wahrheit and Platons lehre von der Wahrheit. The explanation of the truth of being from the fundamental ontology is primarely lead by the regard on the distinction between handy being and the being that just occurs and their respective modifications of understanding: handling and gazing. The explanation of Heideggers notion of the truth from the early thirties should refer to deeper level of research, where the basic distinction of being and understanding not yet appears. On this deeper degree finds Heidegger the notion of the truth as the exposure to the being in the openness of relating. This conception of the truth should be introduced as an avoidance of the problematic dualism in the fundamental ontology and as a deeper point of view, in which the truth is not derived from the understanding of existence, but from the ek-sistential exposure to the being, which let itself to be led by it.
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The theory of common nature of Thomas Aqvinas in the treatise De ente et essentia
BUZKOVÁ, Markéta
The work deals with theory of common nature and universals of Aquinas in the treatise De ente et essentia. In first part is defined conceptual foundation based on Aristotelian and Avicennian concepts of essence and existence. Avicenna defines two ways how can be essence considered. First it is absolute consideration of the essence and second the essence considered as it has being. Thomas Aquinas develops his notion of essence in a quite noticeable Avicennian framework. In the second part are presented the theory of common nature by St. Thomas. The theory is based on the essence considered as it has being, we can found it in rational soul.
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