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Kant and Husserl on Transcendental Character of Experience
Trnka, Jakub ; Moural, Josef (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee) ; Novotný, Karel (referee)
The aim of the thesis is to examine both Husserl's and Kant's transcendentalism in a way that would avoid the tendency to put the main accent on Husserl, which is an approach common to almost all literature dealing with this topic so far. Since it is for the most part Husserl's own critique of Kant that inspires such ongoing underestimation of Kant in comparison to Husserl, this work focuss on the question of the legitimacy of this critique. The core of the thesis is an original interpretation of Kant's transcendental philosophy which, instead of taking for granted the phenomenological point of view, attempts to describe Kant's philosophical enterprise from its own perspective and in its own right. In its second part, the thesis provides a brief description of how Husserl, starting initially from the position of descriptive psychology, arrives at a transcendental dimension. When so put side by side, it becomes evident that the two transcendental positions are in fact very different. Husserl's critique of Kant then appears as unjustified, even though quite understandable as an attempt to draw back from certain immature motives of his own philosophy.
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Reality as Self, Thing and Their Relation
Jahoda, Lukáš ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee)
The meaning of this work is to grasp the development of early-modern philosophy into "modern" philosophy on the basis of the subject-object issue, which is considered and demonstrated as ontologically entirely fundamental. The expression of this development is illustrated for reason of deeper clarification of the sense and meaning of modern philosophy. The ontology of early-modern philosophy is essentially determined through the categories of subject and object, self and thing. The most universal nature of this ontology is based on object of reality fixation which is self, thing, or both. The notions of self and thing are in this work introduced in their totality through the extreme positions of two early-modern philosophers. The demonstration of the extreme philosophy of the subject is Berkeley. The demonstration of the extreme philosophy of the object is Spinoza. On the basis of explication of their ontology is explicated the universal nature of early-modern ontology. The end of early-modern ontology and its transition into "modern" ontology happens through the reconstruction of the subject-object figure. The author of this reconstruction is Hegel. Reality is now placed neither into the subject neither into the object, but into their mutual relation.
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Religion and Morality: God in Kant's practical philosophy
Bizubová, Barbora ; Kouba, Pavel (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee)
I follow two basic lines in the inquired works: I find out, first, how Kant operates with the concept of God and how can this concept be understood in context of his philosophy as a whole. Second, as a consequence of it I consider the relation between human morality (or categorical imperative) and faith (religion). The postulate of the existence of God that Kant puts forward in the Critique of Practical Reason gives rise to the question: How can the idea of God be compatible with the autonomous morality, which is in fact the main pillar of Kant's ethics (formulated in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral)? The Religon within the limits of reason alone answers some of the basic questions considering the concept of God and religous belief. Thanks to these answers it can be shown how the autonomy of the will is compatible with the religion. Key words Human morality, philosophy of religion, God, the categorical imperative, the highest Good
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Freedom and Ethical Life; Hegel's Conception of Freedom in Elements of the Philophy of Right
Zelenda Kupcová, Adéla ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
Práce se zaměřuje na pojetí svobody v praktické filozofii G. W. F. Hegela a jejím vztahem k etice, konkrétně k moralitě a mravnosti. Zkoumán je i vztah svobody a společenských struktur, v nichž jedinec žije a svou svobodu nejen realizuje, ale i získává. Cílem práce je zohlednit možný vliv Hegelova pojetí svobody na současné otázky a problémy a k jejich reflexi v politické filozofii a sdělit, jaký přínos může mít Hegelova praktická filosofie pro současnou filozofii i společenské vědy jako takové. Práce vychází zejména z Hegelova spisu Základy filosofie práva, ale přihlíží i k jeho Filosofii dějin a Fenomenologii ducha. KLÍČOVÁ SLOVA: politická filosofie; Hegel; svoboda; etika; moralita; mravnost ABSTRACT: This work is focused on the concept of freedom in the practical philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel and its relation to ethics, specifically the morality and ethical life. Also researched is the relation of freedom and social structures in which individual lives and in which is his freedom not only realized but also gained. The goal of the work is to consider the influence of Hegel's practical philosophy on contemporary questions and problems and to its reflection in political philosophy. The answer should be, what kind of contribution may Hegel's philosophy have for contemporary philosophy and social...
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The aesthetic revolution and subjectivity
Magid, Václav ; Petříček, Miroslav (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee)
The thesis is dedicated to the question of relation of Schlegel's conception of the "progressive universal poetry" to the principle of the aesthetic autonomy as the central feature of the modern notion of art. Against the opinion of J. M. Bernstein the point of view is defended, according to which Schlegel's theory doesn't undermine but advances the aesthetic autonomy. The interpretation of romantic philosophy in work of Manfred Frank serves as a base for the argument. The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first two of them offer the basic outline of the problem of the aesthetic autonomy as the context in which Schlegel's romantic aesthetic is to be examined. The third and the forth chapters introduce the main elements of this theory. The fifth chapter summarizes Frank's interpretation of the philosophy of Friedrich Schlegel. The sixth chapter contains the resume and subsequent challenging of the argument of J. M. Bernstein, who argues that the conception of the "progressive universal poetry" leads to the "philosophical disenfranchisement of art". On the background of its criticism the alternative position is offered, which holds, that Schlegel advances the doctrine of the aesthetic autonomy by replacing the view of an artwork as an actual binding of nature and freedom with the notion of the...
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The intelligible act in Schelling's treatise of Human Freedom and in the Ages of the World as a way of moral realization
Adámek, Petr ; Petříček, Miroslav (advisor) ; Karásek, Jindřich (referee) ; Sirovátka, Jakub (referee)
In my thesis I deal with Schelling's theory of the intelligible act in the treatise Of Human Freedom and its continuation in the Ages of the World. In my view Schelling endeavours to outline a way of human moral realization by means of this theory. In the first chapter of my thesis I explore the principles of God's revelation (the dark ground and the will of love) including the phases of God's revelation. In the second chapter I focus on Kant's theory of the intelligible act in the work Religion within the limits of reason alone. Against the background of these chapters I try to clarify Schelling's theory of the intelligible act in Of Human Freedom in the third (salient) chapter. The intelligible act occurred before time simultaneously with God's creative act, but is separable from it. Through this act I am, as it were, at the beginning of all existence within God's undifferentiated will and choose my own (good or bad) essence before my being in time. According to many authors (Peetz, Hermanni etc.) Schelling's theory is beset by a problem relating to any potential change of my essence in time. If I have decided for evil or for good, my individual actions in time have with necessity the same quality. According to them Schelling's theory implies that it is not possible that there should be any change...
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The Problem of Self-consciousness in Fichte's Philosophy. Study in Pragmatic History of the Human Mind
Vrabec, Martin ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee) ; Kuneš, Jan (referee)
Submitted essay is an inquiry into J. G. Fichte's early philosophy focused particularly on Foundation of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre as a central work of his early period. Interpretation is based on assumption that its principal aim consists in manifestation of the way leading to emergence of our commonsense and ordinary understanding with reference to both world and ourselves. This approach carries Fichte's affilation with tendency inherent to transcendental philosophy of his era not only in its search for the origin of empirical knowledge, but for the origin of aprioristic structures of our experience especially. His transcendentally laden search manifests itself as so called "pragmatic history of the human mind", the principal object of our inquiry. Here we can find an attempt to reconstruct just transcendental, but not "real", temporally sequential, genesis of our mind from original state of feeling to our common representation both about independently existing things and ourselves as free cognizing subjects. Application of this philosophical method allows him to genetically derive and justify basic forms of our experience and its aprioristic components like space, time, substantiality or causality. The first part of essay introduces fundamental principles of Fichte's philosophical system and...
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The absolute I and the conception of knowledge in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte
Kollert, Lukáš ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Landa, Ivan (referee)
This bachelor thesis outlines basic features of object-consciousness and tries to show that it must be grounded in a "consciousness" of another type, which doesn't have the structure (non-identity of subject and object) characteristic for the consciousness of an object. The pre- reflective relation of the self to itself or immediate "consciousness" of the self is identified as a basis enabling self-(re)cognition in reflexion. The next step puts forward one of reasons to ascribe this relation of the self to itself to the self-positing absolute I (here the absence of subject-object difference is typical). The fourth chapter addresses questions concerning the possibility to explain the object-consciousness and the presence of manifold in the I from the standpoint of unlimited and self-identical absolute I. It further distinguishes several forms of realism and idealism rejected by Fichte himself and follows the course leading to Fichte's own position, i. e. real-idealism or ideal-realism. Finally, the text discusses in detail the concept of "check" (Anstoß), which is understood as one of the key concepts of the early science of knowledge. Key words: Fichte, science of knowledge, self-consciousnes, object-consciousness, absolute I, check, idealism, realism, sensation, reflection
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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