Název:
A note on equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Autoři:
Celik, Levent ; Karabay, B. Typ dokumentu: Výzkumné zprávy
Rok:
2011
Jazyk:
eng
Edice: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, svazek: 440
Abstrakt: The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.
Klíčová slova:
equilibrium uniqueness; ultilateral bargaining; veto players Číslo projektu: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 (CEP)