Original title:
A note on equilibrium uniqueness in the Baron-Ferejohn model
Authors:
Celik, Levent ; Karabay, B. Document type: Research reports
Year:
2011
Language:
eng Series:
CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 440 Abstract:
The Baron-Ferejohn multilateral bargaining model predicts a payoff-unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) in which players' equilibrium strategies are not uniquely determined. In this note, we present a modified version of the Baron-Ferejohn model by introducing veto players and provide a sufficient condition to obtain a truly unique SSPE in terms of payoffs as well as players' equilibrium strategies.
Keywords:
equilibrium uniqueness; ultilateral bargaining; veto players Project no.: CEZ:AV0Z70850503 (CEP)