Řídit povstání jako firmu: sebepoškozující patronát principála ve východní Ukrajině

Laryš, Martin

The dissertation draws on the literature on indirect warfare based on principal-agent theory, which conceptualizes indirect warfare as an example of delegation. Principals play an important role in shaping the rebellion and exerting control over it through the delegation used as a low- cost and deniable device for empowering the rebel proxies. However, the delegation is fraught with problems, especially when delegated to fragmented rebels. The literature considers the fragmented rebel militias as weak non-state actors prone to rapid failure and decay. My argument focuses on the paradox of delegation to the fragmented rebel groups. I claim that such delegation is inherently costly and visible, which contradicts the original intention of delegation as a low-cost and deniable foreign policy tool. In my dissertation, I introduce the concepts of self-defeating patronage and decentralized delegation as my contribution to the discussion on indirect warfare. The principal suffers self-defeating patronage because it must keep the barriers-of-entry low for the incipient rebel groups to overcome the collective action problem that the would-be rebels experience due to their weak social ties. Keeping the barriers low without strict control by the principal - that would raise the costs and visibility - fuels...

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