Název: Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs
Autoři: Palguta, J. ; Pertold, Filip
Typ dokumentu: Výzkumné zprávy
Rok: 2018
Jazyk: eng
Edice: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, svazek: 630
Abstrakt: Wages paid to politicians affect both the selection of candidates into electoral races and the on-the-job performance incentives of incumbents. We differentiate between selection and incentive effects using two regression discontinuity designs based on: 1) population thresholds shifting politicians' wages and 2) electoral seat thresholds splitting candidates into those who narrowly won or lost. We find that higher wages do not increase the electoral incumbency advantage, suggesting that the incentive effect of higher wages does not impact re-election rates. We further show that higher wages motivate narrowly elected incumbents to run again much less often than past narrowly non-elected candidates.
Klíčová slova: electoral competition; political selection; re-election

Instituce: Národohospodářský ústav AV ČR (web)
Informace o dostupnosti dokumentu: Dokument je dostupný na externích webových stránkách.
Externí umístění souboru: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp630.pdf
Původní záznam: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0289828

Trvalý odkaz NUŠL: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-390094


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