Original title: Do higher wages produce career politicians? Evidence from two discontinuity designs
Authors: Palguta, J. ; Pertold, Filip
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2018
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 630
Abstract: Wages paid to politicians affect both the selection of candidates into electoral races and the on-the-job performance incentives of incumbents. We differentiate between selection and incentive effects using two regression discontinuity designs based on: 1) population thresholds shifting politicians' wages and 2) electoral seat thresholds splitting candidates into those who narrowly won or lost. We find that higher wages do not increase the electoral incumbency advantage, suggesting that the incentive effect of higher wages does not impact re-election rates. We further show that higher wages motivate narrowly elected incumbents to run again much less often than past narrowly non-elected candidates.
Keywords: electoral competition; political selection; re-election

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp630.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0289828

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-390094


The record appears in these collections:
Research > Institutes ASCR > Economics Institute
Reports > Research reports