|
|
Experimental Testing of Game-Theoretic Predictions: The Ultimatum Game
Matysková, Ludmila ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Melikhova, Oksana (referee)
This thesis focuses on testing of game theoretical predictions in the ultimatum game by means of controlled experiments. This game has become one of the most scrutinized games from the area of bargaining game theory. The theoretical division of the reward, which the players bargain over, is such that one player gets virtually all the reward while the second player is left with nothing. Because of such an extreme division of the reward, the game represents a severe test for the theory. In fact, experimental results do not confirm to the theory. This thesis provides a survey of the experimental studies investigating different aspects that may affect the subjects' behavior in the game. Furthermore, some possible explanations for why the theoretical solution is not observed to be played by the subjects in the laboratory are presented. I show several new models, which try to capture the real nature of the subjects' behavior in the game. I also focus on the proposers' behavior from the income-maximizing point of view if the distribution of the responder's minimum acceptance thresholds is known to them. Outline of a new experiment examining such behavior is then presented.
|
|
|
Fairness and Emotions in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Approach
Fedosová, Polina ; Korbel, Václav (advisor) ; Votápková, Jana (referee)
This bachelor thesis examines the role of emotions in the decision-making process by making individuals treated unfairly. We conducted a simple Ultimatum Game and measured emotional responses of Responders when the offer is displayed. We found significant positive relationship between the offer and intensity of neutrality and surprise experienced by Responders and significant negative effect of offer on intensity of experienced anger and disgust was detected. Further examination also indicated significant negative relationship between the action taken by Responders (rejecting or accepting the offer) and intensity of experienced anger leading us to the conclusion about the correlation between this emotion and rejection. The analysis is also complemented by validation that behavior of our sample in the Ultimatum Game follows the robust behavioral pattern (frequent rejection of positive but low offers) in this experimental game. Keywords fairness, emotions, Ultimatum Game, FaceReader, experiment
|
|
|
Game theory and rational decision-maker
Plaček, Vilém ; Dlouhý, Martin (advisor) ; Sekničková, Jana (referee)
View of rational choice in coherence with ultimatum game. Rational choice theory adjusted by joining behavioral economics to better comprehend decision-making processes. In this thesis I focus on researching strong influences using multiple simple games. Namely: ultimatum game, dictator game and modifications of previous. They will be carried out by online questionnaire. Next step will be analysis of components to determine significant ones and impact of game's modifications. I assume that decision-maker's rationality will be disproven. This thesis will continue with assessing influence of risk and fear of loss. Goal is to gather enough of detailed data about motivations and participants in order to perform analysis and establish statistically significant influences.
|
|
|
Third Party Punishment Games: What Do They Really Measure?
Radová, Magdaléna ; Cingl, Lubomír (advisor) ; Lebovič, Michal (referee)
This work focuses on costly punishment imposed by unaffected observing third parties in economic experiments. Third-party intervention is applied to enforce social norms in situations in which the retaliation by directly harmed second parties is not possible or sufficient. I provide a coherent overview of recent experimental research, and examine the characteristics of third-party sanctions, socio-cultural variations and underlying motives of punishment behavior. The existence of third-party punishment contradicts the standard economic predictions but is consistent with some theoretical models of social preferences. The experimental results show that third-party punishment is present across societies in strength proportional to the degree of norm violation. Punishment may be an emotional reaction to observed injustices or imposed instrumentally to change the unequal distribution of resources, enhance cooperation and increase social welfare. At the end of the work, I outline an experiment to examine the efficiency of third-party punishment in comparison with the third-party reward on maintenance of cooperation norm.
|
|
|
Experimental Testing of Game-Theoretic Predictions: The Ultimatum Game
Matysková, Ludmila ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Melikhova, Oksana (referee)
This thesis focuses on testing of game theoretical predictions in the ultimatum game by means of controlled experiments. This game has become one of the most scrutinized games from the area of bargaining game theory. The theoretical division of the reward, which the players bargain over, is such that one player gets virtually all the reward while the second player is left with nothing. Because of such an extreme division of the reward, the game represents a severe test for the theory. In fact, experimental results do not confirm to the theory. This thesis provides a survey of the experimental studies investigating different aspects that may affect the subjects' behavior in the game. Furthermore, some possible explanations for why the theoretical solution is not observed to be played by the subjects in the laboratory are presented. I show several new models, which try to capture the real nature of the subjects' behavior in the game. I also focus on the proposers' behavior from the income-maximizing point of view if the distribution of the responder's minimum acceptance thresholds is known to them. Outline of a new experiment examining such behavior is then presented.
|
|
|
Rozhodování v Ultimatum Game
Avanesyan, Galina ; Zouhar, Jan (advisor) ; Dlouhý, Martin (referee)
The aim of this work is to show that even people who outwardly demonstrate irrational behaviour are actually rational. The only reason why their actions deviate from theoretical rational behaviour is given by different utility functions. Ultimatum game with its easy rules represents a great way to show deviations between human and rational behaviours. The model described in the thesis focuses on Responder's decision making, which is influenced not only by maximization of pure economical profit but also by many other factors, which are summed in the model in one variable -- attitude to fairness. It is shown how this variable can be predicted using decisions obtained from a multi-round Ultimatum game. To prove that humans behave in accordance with their own preferences, the modelled game does not only estimate players' attitudes to fairness but also predicts players' following actions using knowledge of estimated values.
|
|
|
DEMO: What Lies Beneath Players' Non-Rationality in Ultimatum Game?
Avanesyan, Galina ; Kárný, Miroslav ; Knejflová, Zuzana ; Guy, Tatiana Valentine
The rational strategy suggested by the game theory predicts a human playing Ultimatum Game (UG) would have tendency to decide in accordance with the assumption of self-interested rationality, i.e. to choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players [2]. This “utilitarian” and gametheoretically correct “rational” behaviour is however rarely observed when experiments are conducted with human beings [1]. Long-term research in experimental economics indicates that humans do not behave as selfish as traditional economics assume them to do. In UG, human-responders reject offers they find too low while human-proposers often offer more than the smallest amount. An intuitively plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that responders would rather give up some profit than be treated unfairly. This “non-rational” behaviour provides an insight into human’s motivation as a social being. The work challenges this view and insists on human rationality.
|
guest ::
