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Original title:
DEMO: What Lies Beneath Players' Non-Rationality in Ultimatum Game?
Authors: Avanesyan, Galina ; Kárný, Miroslav ; Knejflová, Zuzana ; Guy, Tatiana Valentine
Document type: Papers
Conference/Event: The 3rd International Workshop on Scalable Decision Making: Uncertainty, Imperfection, Deliberation held in conjunction with ECML/PKDD 2013, Prague (CZ), 2013-09-23 / 2013-09-23
Year: 2013
Language: eng
Abstract: The rational strategy suggested by the game theory predicts a human playing Ultimatum Game (UG) would have tendency to decide in accordance with the assumption of self-interested rationality, i.e. to choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players [2]. This “utilitarian” and gametheoretically correct “rational” behaviour is however rarely observed when experiments are conducted with human beings [1]. Long-term research in experimental economics indicates that humans do not behave as selfish as traditional economics assume them to do. In UG, human-responders reject offers they find too low while human-proposers often offer more than the smallest amount. An intuitively plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that responders would rather give up some profit than be treated unfairly. This “non-rational” behaviour provides an insight into human’s motivation as a social being. The work challenges this view and insists on human rationality.
Keywords: Non-Rationality; Players; Ultimatum Game
Project no.: GA13-13502S (CEP)
Funding provider: GA ČR
Host item entry: Preprints of the 3rd International Workshop on Scalable Decision Making held in conjunction with ECML/PKDD 2013, ISBN 978-80-903834-8-7
Institution: Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2013/AS/karny-demo what lies beneath players non-rationality in ultimatum game.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0224700
Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-156645
The record appears in these collections:
Research > Institutes ASCR > Institute of Information Theory and Automation
Conference materials > Papers
Authors: Avanesyan, Galina ; Kárný, Miroslav ; Knejflová, Zuzana ; Guy, Tatiana Valentine
Document type: Papers
Conference/Event: The 3rd International Workshop on Scalable Decision Making: Uncertainty, Imperfection, Deliberation held in conjunction with ECML/PKDD 2013, Prague (CZ), 2013-09-23 / 2013-09-23
Year: 2013
Language: eng
Abstract: The rational strategy suggested by the game theory predicts a human playing Ultimatum Game (UG) would have tendency to decide in accordance with the assumption of self-interested rationality, i.e. to choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players [2]. This “utilitarian” and gametheoretically correct “rational” behaviour is however rarely observed when experiments are conducted with human beings [1]. Long-term research in experimental economics indicates that humans do not behave as selfish as traditional economics assume them to do. In UG, human-responders reject offers they find too low while human-proposers often offer more than the smallest amount. An intuitively plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that responders would rather give up some profit than be treated unfairly. This “non-rational” behaviour provides an insight into human’s motivation as a social being. The work challenges this view and insists on human rationality.
Keywords: Non-Rationality; Players; Ultimatum Game
Project no.: GA13-13502S (CEP)
Funding provider: GA ČR
Host item entry: Preprints of the 3rd International Workshop on Scalable Decision Making held in conjunction with ECML/PKDD 2013, ISBN 978-80-903834-8-7
Institution: Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2013/AS/karny-demo what lies beneath players non-rationality in ultimatum game.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0224700
Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-156645
The record appears in these collections:
Research > Institutes ASCR > Institute of Information Theory and Automation
Conference materials > Papers
Record created 2013-10-10, last modified 2021-11-24