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Modelling of Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information
Straka, Richard ; Smrčka, Aleš (referee) ; Hrubý, Martin (advisor)
This work concentrates on the study of dynamic games; in particular games with imperfect information, implementation of a model and experimentation with the model. The game DarkElf was chosen for this project. It is a strategic, turn based game with economic and military features, where the decisions made by players are simultaneously implemented at a predetermined time.
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Manipulating Verifiable Evidence
Šedek, Jan ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Červinka, Michal (referee)
In this thesis we take the Bayesian persuasion model, impose a limitation on the signal space and subsequently derive the first order conditions for the equilibrium. Then we enhance the model for several different constraints. We find that the analysis is greatly facilitated if such constraints do not relax when more signals are added to the model. The first type of constraint is imposed to eliminate the perfectly informative persuasion mechanisms. The second type of constraint limits the total uncertainty reduction caused by the persuasion. Finally the third type of constraint is a participation constraint. It ensures a certain level of reservation utility for the persuaded party. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Modelling of Dynamic Games with Imperfect Information
Straka, Richard ; Smrčka, Aleš (referee) ; Hrubý, Martin (advisor)
This work concentrates on the study of dynamic games; in particular games with imperfect information, implementation of a model and experimentation with the model. The game DarkElf was chosen for this project. It is a strategic, turn based game with economic and military features, where the decisions made by players are simultaneously implemented at a predetermined time.
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