National Repository of Grey Literature 7 records found  Search took 0.00 seconds. 
Game theory and rational decision-maker
Plaček, Vilém ; Dlouhý, Martin (advisor) ; Sekničková, Jana (referee)
View of rational choice in coherence with ultimatum game. Rational choice theory adjusted by joining behavioral economics to better comprehend decision-making processes. In this thesis I focus on researching strong influences using multiple simple games. Namely: ultimatum game, dictator game and modifications of previous. They will be carried out by online questionnaire. Next step will be analysis of components to determine significant ones and impact of game's modifications. I assume that decision-maker's rationality will be disproven. This thesis will continue with assessing influence of risk and fear of loss. Goal is to gather enough of detailed data about motivations and participants in order to perform analysis and establish statistically significant influences.
The effect of shame in dictator games with information asymmetry
Miklánek, Tomáš
This study introduces a theoretical model of inequality aversion which can also be used in an environment with information asymmetries. The model is based on the non-paternalistic approach where, the own utility function incorporates the utility of other people as perceived by a decision maker. Moreover it allows extensions for other motives which may result in pro-social behavior. I extend the model by adding shame aversion as an additional driver for apparently altruistic behavior. Threat of shame is induced by different levels of exposure of either own actions or identity to the third party observers. I also experimentally test predictions of the model using a very simple environment of a dictator’s game. The experimental design aims to remove additional\nconfounding behavioral effects present in the previous literature. The results suggest that even a very small exposure results in significantly higher amounts sent to recipients. The analysis also shows that the agents, who believe that they can conceal their own actions in front of the less informed counterpart, exploit this information asymmetry for their monetary benefit.
Third Party Punishment Games: What Do They Really Measure?
Radová, Magdaléna ; Cingl, Lubomír (advisor) ; Lebovič, Michal (referee)
This work focuses on costly punishment imposed by unaffected observing third parties in economic experiments. Third-party intervention is applied to enforce social norms in situations in which the retaliation by directly harmed second parties is not possible or sufficient. I provide a coherent overview of recent experimental research, and examine the characteristics of third-party sanctions, socio-cultural variations and underlying motives of punishment behavior. The existence of third-party punishment contradicts the standard economic predictions but is consistent with some theoretical models of social preferences. The experimental results show that third-party punishment is present across societies in strength proportional to the degree of norm violation. Punishment may be an emotional reaction to observed injustices or imposed instrumentally to change the unequal distribution of resources, enhance cooperation and increase social welfare. At the end of the work, I outline an experiment to examine the efficiency of third-party punishment in comparison with the third-party reward on maintenance of cooperation norm.
Are people more altruistic towards persons of the same sex?
Bartůněk, Martin ; Chytilová, Helena (advisor) ; Kadeřábková, Božena (referee)
This thesis deals with the differences in the degree of altruism between men and women, with varying degrees of information. In three rounds of the dictator game experiment, the dictators decided how to redistribute the money between themselves and the recipient. The differences in altruism among the sexes were already dealt with, for example in the works by Andreoni, Vesterlund (2001), Dufwenberg, Muren (2004) or Eckel, Grossman (1998), whose experiments served to inspire the creation of the experimentation in this work. However, the differences in behaviour of men and women in all the observed rounds proved to be statictically insignificant, in this work. The results of this work do not support the hypothesis of a higher degree of altruism in the situation when the dictator has the information about the sex of the recipient, compared to the situation where he does not have it. Male dictators, as well as female ones, behaved equally altruistically to female and male and anonymous recipients.
Limits of the dictator game in relation to altruism
Šestořád, Tomáš ; Doležalová, Antonie (advisor) ; Zajíček, Miroslav (referee)
This thesis investigates an altruism using the dictator game. The purpose of my research is to determine and specify the limits of the game in relation to the altruism. I have managed to alter the rules of the game in order to reduce the effect of inequity aversion and to enable respondents to demonstrate their negative social preferences. I have conducted an experiment, designed to evaluate the hypothesis that the social preferences obtained from the modified games are in average lower than the results of the standard dictator game. Using the Welch`s F-test, I have confirmed the established hypothesis at a significance level 1%. Some of the respondents misunderstood the setting of the experiment; hence its interpretation is limited.
Are people more altruistic, if their decisions are public?
Bartůněk, Martin ; Chytilová, Helena (advisor) ; Svoboda, Miroslav (referee)
This paper deals with the differences of altruism in the frameworks of different anonymity of decision. The hypothesis of this paper claims that human behaviour is more altruistic in the case that it is not anonymous. In order to prove this hypothesis we carried out a two-round experiment (single blind and non-blind) based on an experimental design of dictator game. Students of Špitálská grammar school in Prague were used as the examined subjects. Each of the dictators had to divide money for more than one recipient. In the first round (single blind) the dictators kept for themselves 29,1% on average of the sum to be divided. In the second round (non-blind) they kept only 26,3%. The results of the experiment support the hypothesis of the influence of anonymous decisions on altruism. Which means that altruism increases along with the decreasing degree of anonymity. However, the results of this paper can be limited, because of the insufficient size of the examined sample.
Is the male behaviour less altruistic than the female one?
Pekoč, Marek ; Chytil, Zdeněk (advisor) ; Zajíček, Miroslav (referee)
There are many papers using dictator game framework, but only few of them focus on exploring the differences between women's and men's behaviour in this game. The hypothesis we test is that men are more selfish than women. To do that we conducted two versions of the dictator game experiment. In the first treatment subjects were asked to divide money between themselves and well known humanitarian organization after presentation by a organization representative. In the second modification a different group of subjects divided between themselves evaluation points of a particular university course in two rounds and in between these rounds a histogram of the aggregate results of the first round was disclosed to all participants. Experimental results indicate that men behave less altruistic than women in some situations. Men redistributed by 22.7 % less money to the account of the humanitarian organization than women. On the other hand, there was no difference in behavior between two sexes in the first round of the second treatment. In the second round, however, the behaviour of the two genders was significantly differentiated as women were giving by 14, % more points for the benefit of "opponent", as a result of information provided in the first round about aggregate behaviour of the subjects.

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