Original title: The effect of shame in dictator games with information asymmetry
Authors: Miklánek, Tomáš
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2017
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 581
Abstract: This study introduces a theoretical model of inequality aversion which can also be used in an environment with information asymmetries. The model is based on the non-paternalistic approach where, the own utility function incorporates the utility of other people as perceived by a decision maker. Moreover it allows extensions for other motives which may result in pro-social behavior. I extend the model by adding shame aversion as an additional driver for apparently altruistic behavior. Threat of shame is induced by different levels of exposure of either own actions or identity to the third party observers. I also experimentally test predictions of the model using a very simple environment of a dictator’s game. The experimental design aims to remove additional\nconfounding behavioral effects present in the previous literature. The results suggest that even a very small exposure results in significantly higher amounts sent to recipients. The analysis also shows that the agents, who believe that they can conceal their own actions in front of the less informed counterpart, exploit this information asymmetry for their monetary benefit.
Keywords: anonymity; dictator game; shame

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp581.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0272621

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-356970


The record appears in these collections:
Research > Institutes ASCR > Economics Institute
Reports > Research reports