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Multicriteria games
Tichá, Michaela ; Lachout, Petr (advisor) ; Kaňková, Vlasta (referee)
The concern of this thesis is to discuss different multicriteria games solution concepts. Multicriteria game is a special case from the game theory if the payoff function of at least one player is a vector and the player wants to maximize all the criteria at the same time. The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first instance a few motivation examples are introduced. Subsequently the history of the multicriteria games is mentioned. The theoretical chapter follows. It contains five sections - introduction of new definitions; the structure of the set of equilibria for two person multicriteria games; searching equilibria points by the help of scalarization of the vector-valued function; introduction of ideal equilibria points and ways how to find them; the comparison of used methods. The last solution concept is demonstrated by the real example. Finally a theoretical chapter with new results is included. 1
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Contemporary Social Contract Theories
Froněk, Martin ; Wintr, Jan (advisor) ; Kysela, Jan (referee)
Contemporary Social Contract Theories The thesis is intended to be an introduction into contemporary social contract theories. John Rawls' book A Theory of Justice is a seminal work in this field. The thesis, however, does focus not only on the approach adopted by Rawls, but on the theories of other authors as well - that of J. Buchanan, D. Gauthier, T. Scanlon and R. Nozick. These remain quite unknown in the Czech context. The structure of the thesis should allow for a comparison between the respective theories as the author starts with the object of the social contract, proceeds to the parties of the contract and, finally, to its content. Special attention is devoted to the game theory which models some of the typical interpersonal interactions and, using its theoretical apparatus, can illustrate problems of social cooperation - the key theme of virtually all social contract theories. Eventually, the author tries to outline the way analytic philosophy views the social contract. In its eyes, the social contract is a necessary implication of the existence of language.
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EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust : Antitrust in Payoff Matrix
Luňáčková, Petra ; Hrubý, Zdeněk (advisor) ; Gutiérrez Chvalkovská, Jana (referee)
EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust Antitrust in Payoff Matrix Abstract The thesis consists of two parts - comparative study and antitrust model. First part is dedicated to the comparison of European competition policy and American antitrust. It introduces both policies and focuses mostly on key differences between them, especially on the non-price vertical restraints and monopoly pricing. The economic theory is indecisive about the effects of vertical agreements on competition. The EU finds them often anticompetitive compared to the U.S. that believes in their procompetitive or neutral impact. Second part presents an antitrust model which describes the process of protecting competition and suggests optimal behavior for both enforcement officials and firms. In the game theory framework the payoff matrixes show the difference discussed in the first part and offer theoretical solution. Optimal strategies are derived for American, European and neutral policies and compared afterwards. The case study concludes the thesis and gives a real example of the difference between antitrust and competition policy. Key words: antitrust, competition policy, vertical mergers, game theory, payoff matrix, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, Sherman Act
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Experimental Testing of Game-Theoretic Predictions: The Ultimatum Game
Matysková, Ludmila ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Melikhova, Oksana (referee)
This thesis focuses on testing of game theoretical predictions in the ultimatum game by means of controlled experiments. This game has become one of the most scrutinized games from the area of bargaining game theory. The theoretical division of the reward, which the players bargain over, is such that one player gets virtually all the reward while the second player is left with nothing. Because of such an extreme division of the reward, the game represents a severe test for the theory. In fact, experimental results do not confirm to the theory. This thesis provides a survey of the experimental studies investigating different aspects that may affect the subjects' behavior in the game. Furthermore, some possible explanations for why the theoretical solution is not observed to be played by the subjects in the laboratory are presented. I show several new models, which try to capture the real nature of the subjects' behavior in the game. I also focus on the proposers' behavior from the income-maximizing point of view if the distribution of the responder's minimum acceptance thresholds is known to them. Outline of a new experiment examining such behavior is then presented.
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Game theory and poker
Schmid, Martin ; Hladík, Milan (advisor) ; Zimmermann, Karel (referee)
This thesis introduces the basic concepts of the game theory. Necessary models and solution concepts are described. Follows the summary of the computational complexity of these concepts and corresponding algorithms. Poker is formalized as one of the game theory game models. State of the art algorithms for the ex- tensive form games are explained with the application to the Poker. The thesis also introduces the Annual Computer Poker Competition and participating pro- grams. Finally, new result about the extensive form games with many actions is presented. Keywords: Game theory, Poker, Nash equilibrium, Extensive form games
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Opponent Modelling in Games with Imperfect Information
Kovačič, Milan ; Schmid, Martin (advisor) ; Hartman, David (referee)
The main concern of this paper is the problem of opponent modeling. The goal of this work is to introduce reasonable selection of techniques, which model the opponent's behavior and use it in effective way. In this work I focused on explanation of fundamental terms, introduction of relevant techniques and safety of opponent modeling considering the game of poker. The research showed that effective opponent modeling is indeed possible with reasonable safety and surprising effectivity in comparison with pessimistic equilibrium techniques.
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Probabilistic semantics for Independence-friendly Logics
Seidl, Julian ; Majer, Ondrej (advisor) ; Švarný, Petr (referee)
(in English): Character of the work is purely theoretical and it pursues game theory in the perspective of mathematical logic and probability. The work is divided into two parts. Introductory part compiles basic concepts and definitions, summarizing the game theory and basics of syntax and semantics of mathematical logic and its extensions suitable for work in the field of game theory. Introductory part also explains following terms: extensive and strategic form of games, Nash equilibrium, pure and mixed strategies, winning strategies or independence-friendly logic. The problems solved in the second part of the work such as question of existence of Nash equilibrium in the games with infinite models or issue which arises when trying to uniformly distribute the probability of strategies in the same class of games are sketched out. The second part continues with analysis of strategic games with imperfect information aiming to the solution of nontrivial problems earlier proposed. Second part also introduces basic concepts and definitions of the probability theory, which helps comprehending the problems mentioned above. The last part of the work before the very presentation of some results induced by the area of infinite games is conversion between strategic and extensive games form. In the end of the...
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An overview of selected social procedures
Schlosáriková, Eva ; Majer, Ondřej (advisor) ; Peliš, Michal (referee)
Title: An overview of selected social procedures Author: Eva Schlosáriková Department: Department of Political Science Supervisor: RNDr. Ondrej Majer, CSc. This thesis first defines social procedures. These are studied and analyzed by social soft- ware, an emerging interdisciplinary field. This thesis will focus on a prominent social procedure, the coalition bargaining and coalition formation. Basic definition and overview of the coalition theory are introduced. Last chapter will concentrate on Bram's model of the coalition formation and his definition of the stable coalition. Other models of the coalition bargaining are briefly introduced and compared to the Bram's model. Keywords: coalition bargaining, coalition formation, stability of coalition 1
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Game strategy creation and debugging tool
Roztočil, Jan ; Forst, Libor (advisor) ; Klímek, Jakub (referee)
The aim of this thesis is to create an implementation of a strategic board game of Risk. A play against computer-controlled opponents will be supported, as well as multiplayer game of human players over the Internet. A design of a reusable communication protocol is also a part of the task. An interface for defining a new computer strategies will be provided within the implementation. The program will be oriented as a tool for develepment of those strategies, it will help to debug strategies within an actual game. The program will support MS~Windows and Linux operating systems.
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