Translated title: Problem of immanency by Deleuze lectrice of Sartre
Authors: Soskin, Jonathan ; Novotný, Karel (advisor) ; Gléonec, Anne (referee) ; Dufourcq, Annabelle (referee)
Document type: Master’s theses
Year: 2012
Language: fre
Abstract: [eng] [cze]
Jonathan Soskin June 2012 Master Erasmus Mundus Europhilosophie The problem of immanence in Deleuze's reading of Sartre Abstract This paper intends to explore, more partly than partially, the relationship between the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and that of Jean-Paul Sartre. Such a relationship can be named an apprenticeship, since Deleuze published his very first essays right after the war after reading Being and Nothingness, that impregnates these youthful texts, then entitled his 1964 tribute to Sartre "He has been my master", evokes in several important interviews the major role Sartre philosophically played for him, and moreover praises Sartre's non- subjective conception of the transcendental field in his very last text, "Immanence: a life…", where The Transcendence of the Ego is used to back up Deleuze's own conception of immanence, as it is already the case in What is philosophy ? where for the first time Deleuze dedicates with Guattari a whole chapter to the "plane of immanence". Couldn't the problem of immanence in Deleuze therefore be traced back to his reading of Sartre ? Such is the thesis contained in these pages, where it is argued that immanence is not for Deleuze a solution ready-made in Spinoza or the first chapter of Bergson's Matter and Memory before consisting more essentially in a... Le mémoire presént cherche à montrer comment la pensée de Jean-Paul Sartre a influencé Gilles Deleuze et sa conception de l'immanence. Á savoir, comme le point de vue de l'individu preformé qui domine la référence de Sartre du champ transcendental à la conscience ensemble avec le plan de l'immanence de Deleuze cède la place à le point de vue des forces singulière de l'individuation. Les points de vue ne divergent pas autour la même chose préexistante, ils sont plutôt la "chose en soi", qui est toujours dèja la point de vue et devient une autre en même instant qu'elle s'identifie rétrospectivement avec soi même quand le point de vue change. Nous argumentons que la conception de soi (partie 1) rigoureusement corrélative à la conception de l'autre (partie 3) manifeste le plan-devenir de l'immanence du champ transcendal de Sartre (partie 2), devenir oú la différence et répétition ne sont pas seulement coexistantes mais aussi solidaire, oú la trahison se fait voir comme la meilleure fidélité.

Institution: Charles University Faculties (theses) (web)
Document availability information: Available in the Charles University Digital Repository.
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/42268

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-498218


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Universities and colleges > Public universities > Charles University > Charles University Faculties (theses)
Academic theses (ETDs) > Master’s theses