Original title: Revealing private information in a patent race
Authors: Kocourek, Pavel
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2021
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 693
Abstract: In this paper I investigate the role of private information in a patent race. Since firms often do their research in secrecy, the common assumption in patent race literature that firms know each other’s position in the race is questionable. I analyze how the dynamics of the game changes when a firm’s progress is its private information, and I address the question whether revealing it might be to a firm’s advantage. I find that a firm has an incentive to reveal its breakthrough only if its rival has not done so, and only if the research is costly.
Keywords: optimal effort; patent race; R&D investment
Project no.: 770652

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: https://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp693.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0321574

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-449082


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