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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927-1930
Dubovec, Marcel ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Mitterpach, Klement (referee) ; Muránsky, Martin (referee)
DUBOVEC, M.: Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927-1930 Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for German and French Philosophy The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to present Heidegger's concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. It puts emphasis on the difference between the fundamental-ontological and the transcendental concept of freedom. The elaboration of this difference is founded on the transformation of the ontological difference in its three forms: the difference of the being of beings (existential approach), the difference of the being and beings (transcendental/metontological) and the cosmological difference as a difference between the thing and the world (phenomenological metaphysics). The central manifestation of the difference is the possibility of a deeper understanding of freedom beyond its existential structures (Being and time) that focus on authenticity. The transcendental concept of freedom is the essence of the ground in the context of transcendence and the world and as such it is also the ground for existentially conceived freedom. In order to show this hierarchy in particular, Heidegger's debate on Kant's concept of freedom as spontaneity will be explained. Spontaneity is a specific form of causality and as such it is also grounded in transcendental...
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Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927-1930
Dubovec, Marcel ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Mitterpach, Klement (referee) ; Muránsky, Martin (referee)
DUBOVEC, M.: Heidegger's concept of freedom, 1927-1930 Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for German and French Philosophy The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to present Heidegger's concept of freedom between 1927 and 1930. It puts emphasis on the difference between the fundamental-ontological and the transcendental concept of freedom. The elaboration of this difference is founded on the transformation of the ontological difference in its three forms: the difference of the being of beings (existential approach), the difference of the being and beings (transcendental/metontological) and the cosmological difference as a difference between the thing and the world (phenomenological metaphysics). The central manifestation of the difference is the possibility of a deeper understanding of freedom beyond its existential structures (Being and time) that focus on authenticity. The transcendental concept of freedom is the essence of the ground in the context of transcendence and the world and as such it is also the ground for existentially conceived freedom. In order to show this hierarchy in particular, Heidegger's debate on Kant's concept of freedom as spontaneity will be explained. Spontaneity is a specific form of causality and as such it is also grounded in transcendental...
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Difference of ontological difference in thinking of Martin Heidegger
Dubovec, Marcel ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Novotný, Jaroslav (referee)
DUBOVEC, M.: Difference of ontological difference in thinking of Martin Heidegger (Master's thesis) Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Humanities, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: doc. Mgr. Aleš Novák, Ph.D. The aim of master's thesis consists in explication of ontological difference in Martin Heidegger's thinking. For this purpose is used a dual method of interpretion of difference in the concept of ontological difference. First it is the issue of the difference as such. For the understanding of this idea it is analyzed the text Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics. The second interpretation od difference concentrate on different understanding of ontological difference. The text Basic Problems of Phenomenology is presented as the opposite one, in which the ontological difference is connected with the temporality. The last part of master's thesis concerns the text On the essence of ground. With this the concept of transcendence is introduced as a subject in which the explication of ontological difference leads. Key words: ontological difference, onto-theology, ecstatic-horizontal temporality, Temporality, transcendence, understanding of Being
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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