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Adorno and biopolitics: Thoughts on our well-trained souls and bodies
Gyöngyösi, Megyer ; Maesschalck, Marc (advisor) ; Leclercq, Jean (referee) ; Pourtois, Hervé (referee) ; Gély, Raphaël (referee)
In this text, I propose a novel interpretation of Theodor W. Adorno's thoughts on politics and society from the vantage point of post-Foucauldian biopolitics. The aim of the text is both to find answers to some of the most problematic aspects of Adorno's philosophy (i.e. how to justify the normative claims he makes, what the possibilities of emancipatory politics are) and also to reveal some important insights that might have been underemphasized in current biopolitical discourses (such as the psychological aspects of biopolitical oppression). In the first half of the text, which deals with Adorno's paradigmatic shift in comprehending politics, I consider the question of why he dedicated his political analyses to the micropolitical construction of human life instead of focussing on the more conventional topics of political philosophy. The second half then treats of the resulting question of what kind of moral or political resistance is available. Keywords : Theodor W. Adorno; Biopolitics; Auschwitz; Gender and Sexuality; Emancipatory Politics.
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THE NOTION OF THE INSTITUTUON BY MERLEAU-PONTY
Maes, Gautier ; Gély, Raphael (advisor) ; Dupuis, Michel (referee)
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is known as unfinished. Even if it is quite unfinished, there is a unity in it. The aim of an effective reading of Merleau-Ponty goes through the enlightenment of the movement of this philosophy. Till now, the historiography seems to understand well the boundaries of the thought of the French philosopher, but there's still a gap in the reading, as if, between the 'Phénoménologie de la Perception' and 'Le Visible et l'Invisible', the philosophy of the author was at a break-even point. We want to keep attention on this gap in order to find the coherence back. To do this, we focused on the lesson Merleau-Ponty gave at the 'Collège de France' in 1954-1955. With the notion of institution, Merleau-Ponty helps us to think deeply the link between phenomenology and ontology that means the way from a reflexive philosophy to a philosophy of the flesh. The work we've done was to deal with the notion of institution in order to a better understanding of the movement inside the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.
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GENESIS OF HUMANE AND PERIOD OF LIFE
Hulot, Gaëtan ; Gély, Raphael (advisor) ; Schnell, Alexander (referee)
Univerzita Karlova v Praze Fakulta humanitních studií Faculty of Humanities Mgr. Josef KRUŽÍK, Ph.D. EMM EuroPhilosophie Coordinator U Kříže 8, 158 00 Praha-Jinonice tel.: +420 251 080 335 e-mail: josef.kruzik@fhs.cuni.cz fax: +420 251 080 363 "Tato diplomová práce byla obhájena v rámci navazujícího magisterského programu Filosofie, oboru Deutsche und Franzosische Philosophie in Europa (Europhilosophie) akreditovaného jakožto program Erasmus-Mundus na univerzitě v Louvain, která nepožaduje abstrakty v písemné podobě. Práce byla obhájena v souladu s příslušnou meziuniverzitní dohodou." Mgr. Josef KRUŽÍK, Ph.D. Proděkan pro studijní záležitosti
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Three times nothing. The first time, a phenomenology of nothingness. The second time, an analysis of anxiety. The last time, a fundamental ontology.
Hadzi-Pulja, Vera ; Dupuis, Michel (advisor) ; Frogneux, Nathalie (referee) ; Gély, Raphael (referee)
My Master thesis (Michel Dupuis dir.) was a part of my Erasmus Mundus Europhilosophie curriculum. Focused on the topics of anxiety/dread (Angst) and nothingness (Nichts), it was an opportunity for me to establish a comparison between Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Thus, I attempted to construe the phenomenon of anxiety and the nothingness that this anxiety is getting anxious about, in the works of both philosophers. This analysis led me to elaborate an ontology of birth (as well transcendental and mundane (weltlich)), which is neglected by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit in favour of an interpretation centred on being-toward-death as a way of being for the Dasein. I also determined this ontology of birth as a new starting point for reconsidering the introductory problematic of Sein und Zeit, namely the fundamental ontology (Fundamentalontologie). Overriding Heidegger's failure to lead to its end the project of a fundamental ontology, I maintained that this project would become achievable, but only if based on the ontology of birth previously mentioned. This new way led me to a reinterpretation of the fundamental-ontology, that is to say a science of the Being (Sein) as the Being, beyond particular beings (Seiende) and their essences (Wesen), as metaphysics of facticity.
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