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On the Presupposition Projection in Czech
Veselý, Vojtěch ; Macurová, Alena (advisor) ; Hajičová, Eva (referee) ; Bílková, Jana (referee)
On the Presupposition Projection in Czech I understand presupposition as both an implication and a set of requirements which have to be fulfilled by the (passive) context, i.e. a set of realized propositions and logico- semantic relations between them shared by the communicants. The content of presupposition is formed by information which the speaker characterizes as predetermined, i.e. known to the communicants. Presupposition is a semantically narrower notion than implication: every meaning expressed indirectly is implied, but not every implied meaning is presupposed. Contextually bound constituents express a proposition which is included in the active context, i.e. a set of propositions on which the communicants are actively focused. Contextual boundness is a type of presupposition trigger: information included in the active context is a necessary part of the passive context (it doesn't hold true vice versa, of course). Context shared by the communicants can not be incremented by the primary (i.e. directly expressed) proposition of a clause, unless all the presuppositions semantically entailed in the primary proposition are satisfied. Presupposition is satisfied if and only if proposition p which forms a content of the presupposition is part of the (passive) context. In case that the context...
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On the Presupposition Projection in Czech
Veselý, Vojtěch ; Macurová, Alena (advisor) ; Hajičová, Eva (referee) ; Bílková, Jana (referee)
On the Presupposition Projection in Czech I understand presupposition as both an implication and a set of requirements which have to be fulfilled by the (passive) context, i.e. a set of realized propositions and logico- semantic relations between them shared by the communicants. The content of presupposition is formed by information which the speaker characterizes as predetermined, i.e. known to the communicants. Presupposition is a semantically narrower notion than implication: every meaning expressed indirectly is implied, but not every implied meaning is presupposed. Contextually bound constituents express a proposition which is included in the active context, i.e. a set of propositions on which the communicants are actively focused. Contextual boundness is a type of presupposition trigger: information included in the active context is a necessary part of the passive context (it doesn't hold true vice versa, of course). Context shared by the communicants can not be incremented by the primary (i.e. directly expressed) proposition of a clause, unless all the presuppositions semantically entailed in the primary proposition are satisfied. Presupposition is satisfied if and only if proposition p which forms a content of the presupposition is part of the (passive) context. In case that the context...
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The Theory of Judgment in School of Brentano and in the Early Work of Husserl
Janoušek, Hynek ; Urban, Petr (advisor) ; Moural, Josef (referee) ; Šebestík, Jan (referee)
The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts: The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle - On the several senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) and The Psychology of Aristotle (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of "being" in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object....
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