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The absolute I and the conception of knowledge in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte
Kollert, Lukáš ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Landa, Ivan (referee)
This bachelor thesis outlines basic features of object-consciousness and tries to show that it must be grounded in a "consciousness" of another type, which doesn't have the structure (non-identity of subject and object) characteristic for the consciousness of an object. The pre- reflective relation of the self to itself or immediate "consciousness" of the self is identified as a basis enabling self-(re)cognition in reflexion. The next step puts forward one of reasons to ascribe this relation of the self to itself to the self-positing absolute I (here the absence of subject-object difference is typical). The fourth chapter addresses questions concerning the possibility to explain the object-consciousness and the presence of manifold in the I from the standpoint of unlimited and self-identical absolute I. It further distinguishes several forms of realism and idealism rejected by Fichte himself and follows the course leading to Fichte's own position, i. e. real-idealism or ideal-realism. Finally, the text discusses in detail the concept of "check" (Anstoß), which is understood as one of the key concepts of the early science of knowledge. Key words: Fichte, science of knowledge, self-consciousnes, object-consciousness, absolute I, check, idealism, realism, sensation, reflection
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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The absolute I and the conception of knowledge in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte
Kollert, Lukáš ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Landa, Ivan (referee)
This bachelor thesis outlines basic features of object-consciousness and tries to show that it must be grounded in a "consciousness" of another type, which doesn't have the structure (non-identity of subject and object) characteristic for the consciousness of an object. The pre- reflective relation of the self to itself or immediate "consciousness" of the self is identified as a basis enabling self-(re)cognition in reflexion. The next step puts forward one of reasons to ascribe this relation of the self to itself to the self-positing absolute I (here the absence of subject-object difference is typical). The fourth chapter addresses questions concerning the possibility to explain the object-consciousness and the presence of manifold in the I from the standpoint of unlimited and self-identical absolute I. It further distinguishes several forms of realism and idealism rejected by Fichte himself and follows the course leading to Fichte's own position, i. e. real-idealism or ideal-realism. Finally, the text discusses in detail the concept of "check" (Anstoß), which is understood as one of the key concepts of the early science of knowledge. Key words: Fichte, science of knowledge, self-consciousnes, object-consciousness, absolute I, check, idealism, realism, sensation, reflection
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The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of not-I in Fichte
Dubovec, Marcel ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Sobotka, Milan (referee)
DUBOVEC, Marcel. The problem of solipsism and ontic reality of Not-I in Fichte (Bachelor's thesis). Charles University in Prague, Faculty of Arts, Institute for philosophy and religious studies. Supervisor: Dr. phil. habil. (PD) Jindřich Karásek, Dr. The Bachelor's thesis discuss Fichte's philosophy in connection with principles of the Science of Knowledge. These principles are often mistakenly unified with conception of solipsism. The task of the thesis is to deny this solipsistic understanding of Fichte's philosophy. This is achieved by closer examinig of three texts: Hölderlin's critique, first two principles of the Foundations of the Entire Science of Knowledge. With rejection of the solipsistic position the question of understanding of the absolute I is established. On the one hand there is a transcendental- logical interpretation of absolute I. On the other hand is through Heidegger's ontological difference proposed a hypothesis about understanding of absolute I as a being and Not-I as beings. The author is trying to see these two interpretations in unity.
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