|
|
"To the Relief of Those Who Are in Distress." On the Phenomenon of Pity in the Philosophy of J.-J. Rousseau
Sváčková, Kateřina ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Špelda, Daniel (referee) ; Fulka, Josef (referee)
"To the Relief of Those Who Are in Distress." On the Phenomenon of Pity in the Philosophy of J.-J. Rousseau Kateřina Sváčková The thesis attempts to thematise the philosophical composition of the phenomenon of pity (fr. pitié, compassion) as it was elaborated by J.-J. Rousseau, and on this basis, to present an "ornament of pity" as a phenomenon that is both integral and changeable. First of all, we compose this ornament from three groups of principles: firstly, affection, passion, emotion and the so-called moral sense; secondly, reason and reasoning; and thirdly, two forms of self-love (fr. amour de soi-même, amour propre). In the first part of the thesis, Rousseau's pity comes to be seen as combining these three sets of principles. The individual phenomenon thus constructed is to be applied in the moral, social and public spheres. In Rousseau's idealised theory, pity is generalised through the rational faculties and extended self-love, and extended to the level of cosmopolitan love of humanity (fr. amour de l'humanité) and (thus) love of justice (fr. amour de la justice). We reflect on pity as defined by Rousseau as the "source of moral virtues" or the "source of social relations", tracing the transformation of its original form and strength, of its "quantity" as well as its "quality". Thus, by placing...
|
|
|
To the Philosophical Relation of Compassion and Liberty
Sváčková, Kateřina ; Novák, Aleš (advisor) ; Marek, Jakub (referee)
This thesis deals with two phenomena, compassion and freedom, specifically the concept in the philosophy of A. Schopenhauer and J.-J. Rousseau. We believe that these two themes are essential points of the two philosophical systems. Despite the different contexts, concepts and definitions of the terms, compassion for both philosophers represents a kind of positive ability of human beings (counterweight of the necessary present egoism) from which social virtues and interpersonal relationships arise. Freedom in its largest scale is then the objective of every human being, whether the concept of freedom means anything: positive (possibility of arbitrariness in its natural state, the relative freedom of action) or negative definition of freedom (absence of causality or any form of dependence). The primary objective of this thesis is to outline the possible relations between the two phenomena. It seems that the ability of compassion may potentially be limiting certain forms of human freedom, though such a form of freedom may turn out to be insufficient. It turns out, however, that by using the ability of compassion it is possible to reach the most desirable and liberating freedom.
|
guest ::
