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Scientific Realism and the Natural World
Joseph, Jacques ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Kolman, Vojtěch (referee)
Jacques Joseph Scientific Realism and the Natural World M.A. thesis Abstract The main topic of this work is the relation between the natural world and the world of the natural sciences, and furthermore the relation of both these worlds to our conception of an external reality "as it really is". The core of the work is rooted mainly in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy of science, namely the debate concerning scientific realism, with a section dedicated to Husserl's conception of the relation between the natural world and natural sciences (as described in his Krisis). The goal of this work is to show scientific realism as broken beyond repair, and to then offer an alternative. The problems that plague realism run deep into its roots, many of which it shares with its opponents, the new alternative theory therefore needs to be completely different. This work suggests the "Natural ontological attitude" (NOA) presented by Arthur Fine, a theory that tries to salvage the intuitions that made realism seem so attractive. NOA is then developped, using texts by W. V. O. Quine and D. Davidson, as a minimalistic metaphysics based strongly on language that still manages to provide a relation to an extra-linguistic reality.
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The (in)depence of elementary propositions in early Wittgenstein
Fořtová, Zuzana ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
In my Master's thesis, I focus on the problem of dependence and independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and Some Remarks on Logical Form. The main issue I wish to analyze in my investigation is the question of whether the independence of elementary propositions (asserted in the Tractatus) is necessary for the maintenance of Tractarian truth-functional analysis of propositions. The motivation behind this is the fact that, in the SRLF, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects, after precise argumentation, the independence of elementary propositions concerning characteristics allowing gradation. After analyzing the essential arguments and precise rendering of independence of elementary propositions in the Tractatus and considering arguments for their dependence in the SRLF, I argue that (based on my analysis of both works) the mutual dependence of some elementary propositions is not problematic for Tractarian truth-functional analysis.
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Vinculum substantiale
Kohout, Ondřej ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
In my bachelor's thesis, I focus on the hypothesis of a substantial bond ("vinculum substantiale") in Leibniz's later philosophy. I discuss the whole conception of a substance - main definitions and necessary implications, which have crucial importance for my thesis. After this ontological exposition, I continue with the interpretation of the Christian's mystery of the Eucharist. This one is very important for my thesis because the substantial bond was also meant to solve the problem of the transubstantiation. After these preliminary discussions, I try to show the most important aspects and interpretations of the substantial bond. The outcome of my thesis is a thorough explanation of this hypothesis.
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"Scire Deum esse". Scotus's proof of the existence of God a a genuine achievement of metaphysics understood as an Aristotelian science
Novák, Lukáš ; Sousedík, Stanislav (advisor) ; Karfíková, Lenka (referee) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
Vydali jsme se pátrat po tom, co to pro Dunse Scota znamená, vědět, že Bůh je. Naše zkoumání nám ukázalo, že pro Dunse Scota přirozené, vědecké poznání Boha, které jediné může aspirovat na titul vědění, nelze oddělit od poznání jsoucna jakožto jsoucna - ale nejen to: ani poznání jsoucna jakožto jsoucna nelze dosáhnout nezávisle na poznání Boha. Shrňme nyní nejdůležitější aspekty tohoto vztahu ontologicky pojatého metafyzického zkoumání a poznání Boha, jak se nám v průběhu práce vyjevily. Především se ukázalo, že vědecké poznání Boha není pro člověka dosažitelné v rámci jiné vědy, než je věda o jsoucnu jakožto jsoucnu: pouze v rámci této vědy je totiž možné získat pojmy, které lze na Boha vůbec aplikovat: totiž transcendentální pojem jsoucna, jeho atributy, a pojmy čistých dokonalostí, jejichž bytostná přináležitost do rámce metafyzického zkoumání se ukázala teprve v okamžiku, kdy plně vyšla najevo role, jakou v této vědě hraje poznání Boha. Dále, při zkoumání našich možností pokud jde o vědecké poznání povahy a atributů jsoucna jakožto jsoucna vyšlo najevo, že pro důkaz skutečně transcendentálního rozsahu pojmu jsoucna, tj. pro důkaz jeho indiference vůči konečnosti a nekonečnosti, se neobejdeme bez důkazu existence nekonečného jsoucna, tedy bez důkazu existence Boží - nedisponujeme totiž žádnou jinou...
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Consciousness and the Self: the theories of John Searle and Antonio Damasio
Šebešová, Petra ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The thesis deals with the relationship of consciousness and the self, as it is present in the consciousness theories of John Searle and Antonio Damasio. Consciousness is taken by both authors as an essentially subjective phenomenon and it is analyzed as such. Yet at the same time, they take it to be a natural part of the physical world. First, Searle's arguments concerning the subjective nature of consciousness and the possibilities to study it scientifically are analyzed, together with objections against Searle's view. Then Searle's account of the self is presented. The author argues that this account is not sufficient to explain subjectivity more deeply. Presentation of Damasio's theory follows as a complement to Searle 's theory. Damasio takes the sense of self to be a necessary component of consciousness that is pre-reflectively present and appears in the form of feeling. This notion of the self is supported in the thesis for it allows for better understanding of the phenomenal aspects of consciousness and also forms a basis for a possible scientific research. Damasio's biological hypotheses concerning the emergence of the subjectivity is discussed and criticised though for presupposing the subject, which is yet to be explained by the theory.
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Personal identity and memory (Locke's theory of personal identity and its critical interpretation in analytical philosophy)
Kollmann, Jan ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The thesis deals with the relations between Locke's theory of personal identity, its "classical" critic, performed by Butler and Reid and its critical adoption amongst some authors of analytic philosophy (Grice, Quinton, Perry, Shoemaker). In the first part of the thesis, Locke is shown as the founder of a tradition that lays stress on the fundamental relation between the identity of persons over time and its memory or consciousness. We also distinguish the identity of person and the identity of man, this means person is understood as identical so far as its consciousness reaches, independently of the identity of material and/or immaterial substance in which the identity of man consists. Serious problems with Locke's conception, such as amnesia and paramnesia are discussed in this part too. In the second part of the thesis, classical objections against Locke's theory are analyzed - Reid's "brave officer paradox" and Butler's objection of petitio principii; Reid's and Butler's distinction between 86 the identity of persons and other things. In the third part we discuss two conceptions by contemporary authors (Grice and Quinton) who defend Locke's attitude against the classical objections and who assert, that personal identity consists in a certain sort of psychological continuity (continuity of memory or...
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John Locke - primary and secondary qualities
Štambachová, Lucie ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
Mé zkoumání se v této práci zaměřuje na Lockovu Esej o lidském rozumu (An Essay concerning Human Understanding) z roku 1689, zvláště pak na Lockovo stanovisko k problematice primárních a sekundárních kvalit. Řekněme si však na úvod alespoň základní informace o samotném Lockovi a jeho životě. Locke se narodil roku 1632 jako syn právníka. Studoval na Christ Church College v Oxfordu, kde roku 1658 získal titul mistra svobodných umění. Locke pracoval jako soukromý učitel, lékař, ale také ve státních službách. Mezi jeho díla, kromě výše zmíněné Eseje, patří například Dvě pojednání o občanské vládě (Two Treatises of Civil Government), Myšlenky o vychování (Thoughts concerning Education), Listy o snášenlivosti (A Letter on Toleration) atd. Ze skladby jeho děl je patrné, že Locke byl velmi všestranný myslitel a kromě otázek epistemologických a ontologických se soustředil rovněž na politickou filosofii a na podmínky výchovy a vzdělání. Locke byl zastáncem a jedním z tvůrců tzv. novověkého empirismu, což byl směr vymezující se vůči racionalismu, jehož zakladatelem byl René Descartes. Obě tyto školy si kladly shodné otázky, ale odpovědi, které na ně dávaly, byly různé. Zásadní rozdíl tkví v tom, že empiristé hledali pravdu ve zkušenosti, racionalisté v rozumu. Z těchto protikladných východisek se odvíjejí odlišné...
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Berkeley's approach to Newtonian dynamics
Mihálik, Jakub ; Palkoska, Jan (referee) ; Hill, James (advisor)
The essay concerns Berkeley's reaction to Newton's dynamics. While Berkeley admires the usefulness, simplicity and generality of Newton's laws of motion, he is, none the less, concerned with their possible ontological implications. If we interpret Newton in a realist manner, his doctrines seem to imply that physical objects are active and are thus inconsistent with the basic principles of Berkeley's metaphysics, namely with the view that the only sources of activity in the universe are spirits. Berkeley tries to solve this conflict by offering an account of force according to which force is a mathematical hypothesis and which thus avoids metaphysical commitments. The author suggests that there is a tension between different claims that Berkeley makes about force in De motu and offers an interpretation of Berkeley's view in which he tries to avoid this tension. According to the offered interpretation, Berkeley's view of force is an instrumentalist one. In the last chapter various aspects of Berkeley's view of force as a mathematical hypothesis are considered. It is argued that even though such a view might seem to be in conflict with Berkeley's semantic and metaphysical views, it needn't be so if certain semantic considerations introduced in Berkeley's Alciphron are considered.
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Aristotelian doctrine of potencies in the light of recent theory of dispositional predicates
Peroutka, David ; Sousedík, Stanislav (advisor) ; Novák, Lukáš (referee) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The subject of the presented work are potencies or powers, which are called - in contemporary terminology - also dispositions. Ascription of a disposition to some effect can be substituted by a dispositional conditional sentence of the following type: "If x is (were) suitably tested, x manifests (should manifest) ." As the non-modal way to deal with dispositions does not seem feasible, we employ the modality of necessity to formalize the (subjunctive) dispositional conditional. But the needed necessity cannot be explained merely by means of formal logic. Therefore we accede to the ontological considerations concerning powers. Since we use categorical properties (qualities) to explain behaviour of things, dispositions non-identical with their categorical basis would be superfluous. Hence powers (dispositions) are only conceptually distinct from their qualitative basis. We know categorical properties, but we know them only thanks to their causal potentialities or powers. So power belongs to the essence of corresponding quality, it belongs to it as its relation to some (possible) effect. If the powers belong to the essence of qualities, a qualified thing, qua qualified, necessarily has the corresponding power. As the power ascription can be substituted with a conditional sentence, we may formulate the...
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