Original title: Jazyk a individualita. Několik poznámek ke srovnání Wittgensteina s Husserlem a Heideggerem
Translated title: Language and individuality. Some remarks on comparing Wittgenstein with Husserl and Heidegger
Authors: Beran, Ondřej ; Peregrin, Jaroslav (advisor) ; Kouba, Pavel (referee) ; Glombíček, Petr (referee)
Document type: Doctoral theses
Year: 2008
Language: cze
Abstract: [cze] [eng]
Práce se pohybuje na poli srovnání Wittgensteina s Husserlem a Heideggerem (obecneji: analytické a kontinentální filosofie), má však spíše systematický charakter, a zabývá se otázkou vztahu mezi jazykem, intersubjektivitou a individualitou. Husserl a Wittgenstein ukazují, že naše zkušenost sveta (svet, jak ho známe), je vždy naší zkušeností sveta ("svetem pro nás"), že tato zkušenost je bytostne intersubjektivní, a intersubjektivita je bytostne jazyková. Podoba zkušenosti sveta není arbitrární, nelze ji však "realisticky" oprít o "objektivní" svet, nanejvýš zduvodnit "zevnitr", pragmaticky. Primárne pragmatický charakter naší zkušenosti umožnuje její rozruznení (plausibilní formu relativismu), a naopak ciní problematickými pokusy klást její smysl mimo ni (absolutní teleologické urcení dejin). Ukazuje se také, že Husserlova koncepce, jež klade ne-jazykový život vedomí "pred" jazyk, a individuální subjektivitu "pred" intersubjektivitu", celí jistým problémum; respektive že touto cestou nelze postihnout fenomény myšlení (duševního života) a individuality, jak je bežne chápeme. Heidegger se s Wittgensteinem shoduje v tom, že spatruje v našem jazyce neprekrocitelnou hranici naší zkušenosti sveta - jazyk je médiem, v nemž je nám dán smysl sveta, do nehož jsme se narodili, a v normativním smyslu nás presahuje.... The work compares Wittgenstein with Husserl and Heidegger (or more generally: analytical and continental philosophy), but its character is rather systematic, as it treats the question of the relation among language, intersubjectivity and individuality. Husserl and Wittgensten show that our experience of the world (world as we know it) is always our experience of the world ("the world as it is for us"), that this experience is essentially intersubjective, and that intersubjectivity is essentially linguistic. The shape of the experience of the world is not arbitrary, but it cannot be based "realistically" on the "objective" world, at most it can be founded "from inside", pragmatically. The primarily pragmatic nature of our experience allows its variation (a plausible form of relativism), and on the other hand it makes it problematic to try to set the purpose of the experience beyond its limits (an absolute teleology of history). It is also shown that Husserl's conception, setting the non-linguistic life of the consciousness "before" language and individual subjectivity "before" intersubjectivity, faces certain problems, or that we cannot conceive phenomena of thought (psychic life) and individuality, as we usually understand them, this way. Heidegger agrees with Wittgenstein in the point that language is...

Institution: Charles University Faculties (theses) (web)
Document availability information: Available in the Charles University Digital Repository.
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11956/17660

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-294390


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Universities and colleges > Public universities > Charles University > Charles University Faculties (theses)
Academic theses (ETDs) > Doctoral theses