Original title: Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic
Authors: Palguta, Ján
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2013
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 483
Abstract: This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipated value distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials’ scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process.
Keywords: corruption; manipulation; public procurement

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp483.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0229951

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-170359


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