Original title: Electoral contests with dynamic campaign contributions
Authors: Mattozzi, Andrea ; Michelucci, Fabio
Document type: Research reports
Year: 2017
Language: eng
Series: CERGE-EI Working Paper Series, volume: 599
Abstract: We study a two-period dynamic principal agent model in which two agents with different unobservable abilities compete in a contest for a single prize. A risk-neutral principal can affect the outcome of the contest by dividing a given budget between agents in each period and her net payoff depends on the relative share of the budget given to the winner of the contest. We analyze two settings that differ by the presence/absence of moral hazard. The results we derive are consistent with stylized facts regarding the dynamics of US campaign contributions.
Keywords: contests; dynamic games; experimentation
Project no.: GA13-35452S (CEP)
Funding provider: GA ČR

Institution: Economics Institute AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp599.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0274651

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-364678


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