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World of natural sciences and life world in Husserl's late work
Puc, Jan ; Novotný, Karel (advisor) ; Čapek, Jakub (referee)
The subject of this work is to map the relation between natural sciences and lifeworld on the ground of intentional-historical approach of late Husserl. The description of the problem of Galileo Galilei's foundation of science, its preconditions und consequences follows after an assignment of the main definitions and demonstrating of both arguments which Husserl uses to disprove objectivism. The idea of the mathematical nature establishing the modern physics indicates the necessity of brief clarification of the origin of geometry and philosophy as two motivating sense formations and the importance of the notion of "life-world apriori". In the following part I examine the notion of history which is a precondition of performed analyzes and the role of language in the process of sedimentation of sense. Critical discussion shows the ambiguous notion of the teleology of reason and the danger of confusion of an abstract understood life-world apriori with an overall interpretation of world. The main features of the life-world, the notion of science in the discussion between instrumentalism and science realism and Husserl's new scientism which should accomplish the idea of rational determination of mankind are summed up at the end of the work.
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The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Puc, Jan ; Novotný, Karel (advisor) ; Čapek, Jakub (referee) ; Janoušek, Hynek (referee)
The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the development of the intentional function of speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The intentional function is defined as the change of expressed meaning that is engendered by the expression itself. We trace Husserl's position from the Logical Investigations and the first book of his Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, where he describes speech as the non- productive mirroring of other kinds of intentionality, to the late text The Origin of Geometry, where he discerns two functions of speech: it provides thought its ideality, which is different from the ideality of species; and it provides thought its objectivity, i.e. the form of object that lasts in history as identical. In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl's late position with several profound modifications. The starting-point ceases to be the linguistic sign, and speech becomes a kind of gesture. As a consequence, the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic ideality disappears. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty holds that the expression accomplishes the meaning of what it expresses. In this way, speech becomes creative and ceases to be just an empty intention of...
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The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Puc, Jan ; Novotný, Karel (advisor) ; Čapek, Jakub (referee) ; Janoušek, Hynek (referee)
The Function of Speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the development of the intentional function of speech in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. The intentional function is defined as the change of expressed meaning that is engendered by the expression itself. We trace Husserl's position from the Logical Investigations and the first book of his Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy, where he describes speech as the non- productive mirroring of other kinds of intentionality, to the late text The Origin of Geometry, where he discerns two functions of speech: it provides thought its ideality, which is different from the ideality of species; and it provides thought its objectivity, i.e. the form of object that lasts in history as identical. In The Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl's late position with several profound modifications. The starting-point ceases to be the linguistic sign, and speech becomes a kind of gesture. As a consequence, the difference between linguistic and non-linguistic ideality disappears. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty holds that the expression accomplishes the meaning of what it expresses. In this way, speech becomes creative and ceases to be just an empty intention of...
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World of natural sciences and life world in Husserl's late work
Puc, Jan ; Čapek, Jakub (referee) ; Novotný, Karel (advisor)
The subject of this work is to map the relation between natural sciences and lifeworld on the ground of intentional-historical approach of late Husserl. The description of the problem of Galileo Galilei's foundation of science, its preconditions und consequences follows after an assignment of the main definitions and demonstrating of both arguments which Husserl uses to disprove objectivism. The idea of the mathematical nature establishing the modern physics indicates the necessity of brief clarification of the origin of geometry and philosophy as two motivating sense formations and the importance of the notion of "life-world apriori". In the following part I examine the notion of history which is a precondition of performed analyzes and the role of language in the process of sedimentation of sense. Critical discussion shows the ambiguous notion of the teleology of reason and the danger of confusion of an abstract understood life-world apriori with an overall interpretation of world. The main features of the life-world, the notion of science in the discussion between instrumentalism and science realism and Husserl's new scientism which should accomplish the idea of rational determination of mankind are summed up at the end of the work.
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Being the self: Heidegger's concept of autenticity and its critique
Puc, Jan ; Kouba, Petr (referee) ; Kouba, Pavel (advisor)
The diploma thesis pursuits an answer to the question to the meaning of being oneself. Martin Heidegger's philosophy, as elaborated in Being and Time, underlines the importance of this anthropological question giving it a focal position in the ontological query. For Heidegger, the individuality is identified with an act of acceptance of one's own, typically human way of being, which is the ground for disclosure of Being itself. The work traces this correlation by interpreting Heidegger's concept of human in two steps: the first, meanings hidden in the definition of man as a possibility are qualified, then, the notion of "authentic" existence as a prominent way of revelation of one's own being possibility is put in the centre of interest. I find the core of authenticity, characterized by Heidegger as "resoluteness" (Entschlossenheit), in the act of acceptance of the burden of existence, which I bring to its consequences for selfunderstanding of the man. This point opens the discussion as I consider the understanding of one's own life aimed towards a possibility which man finds himself or herself in one of the basic ways of orientation in the world. However, this conception is not compatible with Heidegger's notion of authentic existence. In the end, consequences of the confrontation of the both concepts of...
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