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EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust : Antitrust in Payoff Matrix
Luňáčková, Petra ; Hrubý, Zdeněk (advisor) ; Gutiérrez Chvalkovská, Jana (referee)
EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust Antitrust in Payoff Matrix Abstract The thesis consists of two parts - comparative study and antitrust model. First part is dedicated to the comparison of European competition policy and American antitrust. It introduces both policies and focuses mostly on key differences between them, especially on the non-price vertical restraints and monopoly pricing. The economic theory is indecisive about the effects of vertical agreements on competition. The EU finds them often anticompetitive compared to the U.S. that believes in their procompetitive or neutral impact. Second part presents an antitrust model which describes the process of protecting competition and suggests optimal behavior for both enforcement officials and firms. In the game theory framework the payoff matrixes show the difference discussed in the first part and offer theoretical solution. Optimal strategies are derived for American, European and neutral policies and compared afterwards. The case study concludes the thesis and gives a real example of the difference between antitrust and competition policy. Key words: antitrust, competition policy, vertical mergers, game theory, payoff matrix, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, Sherman Act
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Predatory Pricing in Transport Sector: Case Study of the STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o.
Dobiáš, Adam ; Vacek, Pavel (advisor) ; Vaško, Dan (referee)
Predatory Pricing in Transport Sector: Case Study of the STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o. Abstract This paper deals with predatory pricing in transport sector. A situation when one company sells its product at a very low price, intending to illegally drive competitors out of the market. Aim of this paper is to discuss mentioned issues in transport sector and to explain methods of solving predatory cases according to the newest guidelines of the European Commission, national competition au- thorities and national courts. Market delineation, dominance determination and predation cost analysis is discussed. Not only theoretical aspect of predatory behaviour and its impact on competition but also a detection of predatory pri- cing by authorities is discussed. Special attention to the specifics of transport sector is given. The core of this paper is an analysis of STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o. case from year 2008, when mentioned company was accused of predatory pricing on their bus line Praha-Brno. Keywords predatory pricing, antitrust, competition, re- levant market, dominance, transportation, SS- NIP test, Reverse Cellophane Fallacy, Office for the Protection of Competition, STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o.
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Private enforcement of competition law
Bocková, Claudia ; Černá, Stanislava (advisor) ; Zahradníčková, Marie (referee)
The purpose of my thesis is to analyse the state of private enforcement of competition law in the European Union and the Czech Republic by taking into consideration the proposals set forth in the Green and White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules issued by the European Commission which were inspired by the U.S. system of private enforcement of antitrust law. Further on, the possible impact of the implementation of such proposals into Czech law will be assessed and experience of Member states will be considered. The dynamic development of this area of law and the never ending political and legal debate on the possibilities of private enforcement in Europe was the reason for why I have chosen to write my thesis on this topic. The thesis is composed of eight chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects of private enforcement of competition law. Chapter One is introductory and is divided into three parts. Part one tackles the difference between public and private enforcement. Part two deals with the evolution of the concept of damages claims and introduces the most relevant decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The third part identifies the problems occurring with damages claims. Chapter Two examines the question of applicable law. Chapter Three...
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Convergence and Divergence of Antitrust in EU and USA after the year 2000
Opat, Daniel ; Šmejkal, Václav (advisor) ; Svobodová, Magdaléna (referee)
81 Summary This thesis focuses on predatory pricing in competition law of European Union and United states of America. The main goal of the thesis is to analyze the development of predatory pricing on the both sides of Atlantic and to show where the approach to predatory pricing is similar and where was used different perspective. The thesis is divided to three chapters. First part of first chapter describes predatory pricing in general. It supplies a complete view on basic elements of predatory pricing that were and some still are used to identify them. Second part of first chapter brings overview of the most important tests of costs and basic economic terminology, that is important for price tests. Last part introduces most important schools of competition law, that had the biggest impact on forming of approaches to predatory pricing. Second chapter deals with main milestones of development of predatory pricing in the United States. It brings chronological overview of laws and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and analyses their importance for next judicial practice. End of this chapter summarizes development of predatory pricing in the USA on basis of foregoing findings. Third chapter similarly describes historically younger, but equally dynamic development of predatory pricing in European Union. At...
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Convergence and Divergence of Antitrust in EU and USA after the year 2000
Opat, Daniel ; Šmejkal, Václav (advisor) ; Svobodová, Magdaléna (referee)
81 Summary This thesis focuses on predatory pricing in competition law of European Union and United states of America. The main goal of the thesis is to analyze the development of predatory pricing on the both sides of Atlantic and to show where the approach to predatory pricing is similar and where was used different perspective. The thesis is divided to three chapters. First part of first chapter describes predatory pricing in general. It supplies a complete view on basic elements of predatory pricing that were and some still are used to identify them. Second part of first chapter brings overview of the most important tests of costs and basic economic terminology, that is important for price tests. Last part introduces most important schools of competition law, that had the biggest impact on forming of approaches to predatory pricing. Second chapter deals with main milestones of development of predatory pricing in the United States. It brings chronological overview of laws and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and analyses their importance for next judicial practice. End of this chapter summarizes development of predatory pricing in the USA on basis of foregoing findings. Third chapter similarly describes historically younger, but equally dynamic development of predatory pricing in European Union. At...
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Predatory Pricing in Transport Sector: Case Study of the STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o.
Dobiáš, Adam ; Vacek, Pavel (advisor) ; Vaško, Dan (referee)
Predatory Pricing in Transport Sector: Case Study of the STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o. Abstract This paper deals with predatory pricing in transport sector. A situation when one company sells its product at a very low price, intending to illegally drive competitors out of the market. Aim of this paper is to discuss mentioned issues in transport sector and to explain methods of solving predatory cases according to the newest guidelines of the European Commission, national competition au- thorities and national courts. Market delineation, dominance determination and predation cost analysis is discussed. Not only theoretical aspect of predatory behaviour and its impact on competition but also a detection of predatory pri- cing by authorities is discussed. Special attention to the specifics of transport sector is given. The core of this paper is an analysis of STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o. case from year 2008, when mentioned company was accused of predatory pricing on their bus line Praha-Brno. Keywords predatory pricing, antitrust, competition, re- levant market, dominance, transportation, SS- NIP test, Reverse Cellophane Fallacy, Office for the Protection of Competition, STUDENT AGENCY, s.r.o.
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Private enforcement of competition law
Bocková, Claudia ; Černá, Stanislava (advisor) ; Zahradníčková, Marie (referee)
The purpose of my thesis is to analyse the state of private enforcement of competition law in the European Union and the Czech Republic by taking into consideration the proposals set forth in the Green and White Paper on damages actions for breach of EC antitrust rules issued by the European Commission which were inspired by the U.S. system of private enforcement of antitrust law. Further on, the possible impact of the implementation of such proposals into Czech law will be assessed and experience of Member states will be considered. The dynamic development of this area of law and the never ending political and legal debate on the possibilities of private enforcement in Europe was the reason for why I have chosen to write my thesis on this topic. The thesis is composed of eight chapters, each of them dealing with different aspects of private enforcement of competition law. Chapter One is introductory and is divided into three parts. Part one tackles the difference between public and private enforcement. Part two deals with the evolution of the concept of damages claims and introduces the most relevant decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The third part identifies the problems occurring with damages claims. Chapter Two examines the question of applicable law. Chapter Three...
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EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust : Antitrust in Payoff Matrix
Luňáčková, Petra ; Hrubý, Zdeněk (advisor) ; Gutiérrez Chvalkovská, Jana (referee)
EU's Competition Policy v. USA's Antitrust Antitrust in Payoff Matrix Abstract The thesis consists of two parts - comparative study and antitrust model. First part is dedicated to the comparison of European competition policy and American antitrust. It introduces both policies and focuses mostly on key differences between them, especially on the non-price vertical restraints and monopoly pricing. The economic theory is indecisive about the effects of vertical agreements on competition. The EU finds them often anticompetitive compared to the U.S. that believes in their procompetitive or neutral impact. Second part presents an antitrust model which describes the process of protecting competition and suggests optimal behavior for both enforcement officials and firms. In the game theory framework the payoff matrixes show the difference discussed in the first part and offer theoretical solution. Optimal strategies are derived for American, European and neutral policies and compared afterwards. The case study concludes the thesis and gives a real example of the difference between antitrust and competition policy. Key words: antitrust, competition policy, vertical mergers, game theory, payoff matrix, Article 101 and 102 of the TFEU, Sherman Act
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Merger Control in the European Union
Moldovanu, Victoria ; Serdarevič, Goran (advisor) ; Vacek, Pavel (referee)
The main goal in this paper is to make an in-depth analysis of the regulatory situations that can arise during mergers when political involvement takes place. The research is based on four controversial merger cases of undertakings within the same country (E.On-Ruhrgas), European Union countries (E.On-Endesa, Unicredit-Hypoverein) and between companies from the USA (Boeing-McDonnell Douglas) that have effect on the European market. We analyze the four mergers using Michele Ruta and Massimo Motta models from the paper "A Political Economy of Merger Policy in International Markets" (2008). By the end of the research we reached the conclusion that due to some lapses in the European Commission Merger regulation at the time of the mergers, as well as due to government involvement in the mergers, they are not always cleared in the benefit of the market competition or consumer welfare, but due to nationalistic interests of governments to have big players on the market or to keep governmental power in certain industries, even with the risk of harming competition. Along with this, from the mergers analyzed here, it becomes clear that local or union authorities scrutinize the foreign acquirers more.
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