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Numerical fiscal rules and fiscal institutions in an economy with a dynamic common pool problem
Janásek, Lukáš ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Hejlová, Hana (referee)
1 Abstract The focus of this bachelor's thesis is fiscal policy of a fragmented government that represents symmetric socio-economic groups. For the analysis of fiscal policy, I develop the model of a dynamic common pool. In the model, the fiscal choices of interest are 1) a level of tax revenue, 2) a level of public productive spending and 3) an intertemporal choice of a level of group's consumption spending. For each of the fiscal decisions, I describe a distortion associated with the fiscal choice stemming from the decentralized decision making. Next, I examine the impact of a deficit ceiling and fiscal institutions that centralize separate fiscal choices of groups on the three distortions. Due to the symmetry of groups, the analysis abstracts from the efficiency-equity trade-off. Among the key results is that three fiscal frameworks can attain the socially desirable fiscal policy: 1) centralization of the productive spending and the tax revenue combined with a deficit ceiling, 2) centralization of the consumption spending, 3) centralization of a budget size and the productive spending.
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Numerical fiscal rules and fiscal institutions in an economy with a dynamic common pool problem
Janásek, Lukáš ; Gregor, Martin (advisor) ; Hejlová, Hana (referee)
1 Abstract The focus of this bachelor's thesis is fiscal policy of a fragmented government that represents symmetric socio-economic groups. For the analysis of fiscal policy, I develop the model of a dynamic common pool. In the model, the fiscal choices of interest are 1) a level of tax revenue, 2) a level of public productive spending and 3) an intertemporal choice of a level of group's consumption spending. For each of the fiscal decisions, I describe a distortion associated with the fiscal choice stemming from the decentralized decision making. Next, I examine the impact of a deficit ceiling and fiscal institutions that centralize separate fiscal choices of groups on the three distortions. Due to the symmetry of groups, the analysis abstracts from the efficiency-equity trade-off. Among the key results is that three fiscal frameworks can attain the socially desirable fiscal policy: 1) centralization of the productive spending and the tax revenue combined with a deficit ceiling, 2) centralization of the consumption spending, 3) centralization of a budget size and the productive spending.
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Fiskální politika v Evropské unii - Quo Vadis?
Žďárek, Václav ; Koderová, Jitka (advisor)
Práce se zaměřila na hodnocení fiskální politiky v Evropské unii. V prvé části jsme shrnuli vývoj fiskální politiky a názory ekonomický směrů na ni. Druhá část se věnuje vybraným problémem fiskální politiky. Je řešena otázka optimálního fiskálního pravidla. Ve třetí části práce je zachycen vývoj v eurozóně. Poslední část se zabývá alternativami pro omezení fiskální politiky v eurozóně.
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