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Human Corporeality in the Philosophy of George Berkeley
Špinka, František ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
George Berkeley is an immaterialist. He conceives the material substance as an unnecessary and internally contradictory concept. Therefore, he posits monism of the spiritual substance. Nevertheless, he does not deny that the physical world, and the human body with it, is in some sense real and existing. It is not a mere illusion. This thesis attempts to show two things. First, that Berkeley believes the human body is real and that it is an idea or, more precisely, a collection of ideas which is, with its existence, dependent on the activity of spiritual substances. Secondly, that Berkeley differentiates this body from other ideas and objects in the physical world by connecting it more intimately to the human nature, which is primarily constituted by the finite spiritual substantiality. This thesis, however, also reveals that the topic of the human corporeality, especially in regard to his spiritual monism, is insufficiently thought through by Berkeley. Keywords: George Berkeley, immaterialism, human corporeality, human body, limited spiritual substances
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Being One Only: The Foundations of Spinoza's Ontology
Vašíček, Jan ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
The subject of this paper is an analysis of the fundamental principles of Spinoza's ontology, as presented primarily in the first book of Ethics. There is a parallel effort to outline a conceptual scheme, which could render this ontology in a well arranged manner. The heart of the text consists in a study of some of the important metaphysical categories, that define the space of Spinoza's substantial ontology. Namely the concepts of quantity and difference, existence and causality, immanence and finiteness. These categories represent somewhat generalised line of argumentation, in the course of which some of the traditional problems of the research in Spinoza's metaphysics will be covered. For example, the problem of shared attribute or the question of the substance-attribute relation. In the final part this will lead to an interpretation, based on the previous findings, of how nature follows from God and relates to him. 1
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Methodology of the mind-body problem in Bergson's Matter and Memory
Vališka, Tomáš ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Čapek, Jakub (referee)
Bergson's Matter and Memory presents original conception of perception which is developed on the grounds of dualistic ontology. So, Bergson's solution to mind-body problem is not an attempt to explain it as an isolated phenomenon, it is rather ambitious project which puts perception into world where the order of perception and the order of mathematical science coexist. In this dissertation, I will try to determine methods which govern solutions to problems of Matter and Memory. I will also deal with Time and Free Will in outline.
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The Rule-Following Paradox
Samčík, Jozef ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
This bachelor thesis is focused on a paradox which is mentioned by Wittgenstein in the §201 of the Philosophical Investigations. This paradox states: depending on interpretation, every course of action can be made out to accord or to conflict with a given rule. Kripke calls this problem the rule-following paradox and considers it to be the central problem of the Philosophical Investigations. Firstly I will explore a role that the term "rule" plays in a broader context of Wittgenstein's approach to language. I will argue that "obeying the rule" has a key role in understanding the concept of meaning. Next I will give an account of the rule-following paradox as it is presented by Kripke. Then I will describe impact of the paradox on various concepts of meaning. Lastly I will compare and evaluate Kripke's and McDowell's interpretations of the solution of the rule-following paradox offered by Wittgenstein. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Rorty and Davidson on Truth
Šulcová, Kristýna ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
(in English): Richard Rorty and Donald Davidson are (at least verbally) in agreement on many essential topics in the philosophy of language, including their rebuttal of the correspondence theory of truth, the impossibility to define truth and the untenability of both the scheme-content distinction and the dichotomy between realism and anti-realism. Yet substantial differences remain, as represented especially by Davidson's insistence on the importance of objective truth and by Rorty's idiosyncratic pragmatism. The task of this thesis is to identify Rorty and Davidson's mutual differences more precisely and find out whether their philosophical projects might in the end prove compatible or if, on the contrary, their broad agreement is only apparent. With this end in view, the thesis traces the concept of truth in the hands of both philosophers with a special focus on Davidson's concept of objective truth. I conclude that Rorty systematically misinterprets Davidson as far as the latter concept is concerned. However, as both Davidson and Rorty remain hostile to treating truth as a normative concept, this need not mean that their views are completely incompatible.
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Philosophical possibilities of question of personal identity
Endrle, Jaroslav ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
(in English): The topic of this thesis is the problem of personal identity. Its aim is to develop alternative approach to this question. To achieve this, the following course is choosen. Firstly, three most important assumptions are exposed. These assumptions steer debate about this topic in analytic philosophy and are regarded as main cause of its difficulties. These suppositions are - the ontological conception of identity, logical dissociability of mind and body and the method of thought experiment. Essential part of following thesis can be taken as proposal of technique that can overcome these assumptions and problems they cause. This attempt begins at the end of first part with development of general criticism of ontological conception of identity and with presentation of epistemic conception of identity. The second and crucial part deals with the theory of conceptual system. This theory provides a basis for alternative approach to question of personal identity. It will block the logical dissociability of criterions of personal identity - the dissociability of mind/consciousness and living body. It will also serve as fundament for epistemic conception of identity. Finaly, it is used for tracing the origin of concept "person". It will be shown that the concept of person descends from the...
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Conception of an Object as a Complex of Perceptions in David Hume's Philosophy
Fršlínek, Jan ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
Práce pojednává o objektu (jakožto komplexu percepcí) a s daným tématem souvisejícími otázkami v kontextu filosofie Davida Huma, jak je obsažena především v první knize jeho díla Treatise of Human Nature a rovněž s přihlédnutím k dílům Enquiry Concerning Human Undestanding a An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature a dalším titulům primární a sekundární literatury. Tematizováno je v tomto kontextu tedy nejprve Humovo pojetí percepcí jako takové (a to na základě první kapitoly Treatisu, Of ideas, their origin, composition, connexion, abstraction etc.). Poté je v souvislosti s předchozím pojednáno i o Humově pojetí identity (především objektu-tělesa) a jeho koncepce individuace, resp. i stálosti a koherence. (a to na základě čtvrté kapitoly Of scepticism with regard to senses). Na konci práce jsou kontrastovány různé možné typy objektů, jež lze (dle autora této práce) chápat jako komplexy percepcí a poté je nabídnuto schéma hypotézy o individuaci tzv. materiálních těles (bodies) v prostoru.
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From Descates' Mind to Kant's Reason
Dekastello, Petr ; Hill, James (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The basic subject-matter of my research is R. Descartes' Meditations On First Philosophy and I examine the term intellect and its position within the mind and its relation to thought. My work includes a study of sensation and imagination which provide the intellect with "material" to judge. The objective of my thesis is to demonstrate the role the intellect plays in terms of reason and to present an interpretation of the way in which the mind is designated in relation to reason according to Rene Descartes in his writing and in his responses to objections. The position and functions of the intellect are understood as a logical structure of mutual dependence and as the elements essential for the understanding of the human soul substance. At the end of my thesis I demonstrate that the system of reason of R. Descartes might be considered as the basis for the transcendental conception of reason in Kant's philosophy, which leads to an idealistic world conception and is founded on thinking a priori. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge. A Study on the Role of the Subject and the Awareness of Thought in Descartes' Philosophy
Kollert, Lukáš ; Karásek, Jindřich (advisor) ; Palkoska, Jan (referee)
The thesis aims at examining Descartes's so called cogito from a wider perspective, especially as regards to the role in the development of Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641) and in the context of other relevant texts. Being an attempt to give a broad account of Descartes's "first cognition" the study deals not only with the cogito itself, e.g. with its logical structure, but also with other key Cartesian doctrines, so that we can understand the cogito as an integral part of Descartes's philosophy. The thesis inquires for this reason into the question of meditator's identity, the methodological skepticism, the question whether logical principles are called into question in the First meditation, the problem of the Cartesian circle, the distinction between implicit and explicit knowledge, the doctrine of innate ideas and finally, the question how to explain, according to Descartes, the awareness of our thoughts. Sometimes the considerations become rather systematic and go beyond a mere exegesis of Descartes's philosophy, especially when they concern the problem with the presence of ego in cogito and the explanation of our self-consciousness. There are three competing approaches to the second issue mentioned that are introduced and assessed in the last chapter. I have chosen this way of...
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Spinoza's Concept of the Individual
Petříček, Jan ; Palkoska, Jan (advisor) ; Švec, Ondřej (referee)
The aim of the proposed thesis is a partial reconstruction of Spinoza's theory of the individual. This theory can be found in Spinoza's Ethics and consists of three components: namely, Spinoza's doctrines of singular essences, of physical individuals and of conatus. In this thesis, we focus on the doctrine of conatus; however, since the three conceptions are tightly connected, the doctrines of physical individuals and of singular essences will be briefly touched upon as well. The starting point of our thesis is the following problem: Spinoza simultaneously uses multiple terms to designate conatus - and those terms seem, at least at the first sight, to have very different meanings. Specifically speaking, Spinoza identifies conatus with "power of acting", "force of existing" and "actual essence". First, we present a brief explanation of meanings of those terms and subsequently we attempt to reconcile them. In order to be able to do so, we expound Spinoza's doctrine of essences in more detail; afterwards we show that the aforementioned terms can indeed be reconciled if conatus is understood as force by which an essence produces its necessary properties. In the next step, however, we discover that this conception of conatus is not yet wholly adequate, because it disregards the fact that an essence can...
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