|
|
Spectrum auction and It's impact on telecommunication industry
Tománek, Petr ; Hořejší, Bronislava (advisor) ; Sirůček, Pavel (referee)
This work adresses oligopoly in telecomunication industry. Proper attention is given to the one of the biggest obstacles in entering the marker, which is acquiring the licence for the radio transmitting. Czech telecommunication Office decided to release these licences in a form of the auction. The work looks on the whole proces from the perspective of the game theory. Each participant is described and considered to be one of the players and regulatory agency as the rule maker of the game. Characteristics of the offered frequencies are alse discussed. The work investigates both of the carried out actions. Their results are examined and compared to the theoretical projections given by the game theory. Finally, a comparison with the auctions from the other european contries is given from the perspective of the outcome and defined rules.
|
|
|
Teorie her a její aplikace v globálním ropném průmyslu
Šťastný, Kryštof ; Hořejší, Bronislava (advisor) ; Makovský, Petr (referee)
This thesis will enable the reader to see how applications of game theory can help understand the development in oil market. Firstly, the thesis will introduce to the reader the foundations of game theory, a branch of microeconomics studying strategic interaction. Special focus will be put on the theory of oligopoly, the most important collusive and non-collusive models of oligopoly and their similarities and differences. Secondly, the thesis will show the reader how these theoretic models can be applied to the past development within the global oil industry, most prominently on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. Finally, the thesis will present possible applications of game theory and some of the models to the oil market after the price decrease which started in 2014. This would help the reader assess the potential outcomes of the current crisis and possible development in the future.
|
|
|
Generalisation of Cournot oligopoly model for more players
Nehasil, Václav ; Chrobok, Viktor (advisor) ; Zouharová, Martina (referee)
This thesis deals with oligopolistic market and situations occurring in it. Its aim is to approximate basic principles and rules, which relate to oligopoly. Thesis is limited to the situation when the products of all firms are homogeneous and these firms compete only by the produced quantities. Models of Cournot and Stackelberg are introduced in it. The possibilities of cooperation are being researched using the theory of games. Solved mathematical problem is attached to each of these models and it demonstrates all the procedures properly. Derivation of general formulas, if all cost and price functions are linear, is located in the second part of the thesis. Their utilization is demonstrated on solved mathematical problem and verification of them is located there.
|
|
|
Oligopolization of banking industry in Czech republic
Pýcha, Mikuláš ; Mandel, Martin (advisor) ; Šíma, Ondřej (referee)
Bachelor thesis is targeting towards problem with oligopoly and capital accumulation of banks. This thesis analyses contemporary issues in financial world, which results from capitalistic order and it mostly focuses on banking industry. Firstly we focus on history of oligopoly and monopoly that are closely related to Karl Marx and his thoughts. Then we subscribe terms of oligopoly and monopoly and reasons why do they arise. Primarily we examine concepts of economies of scale or entrance barriers, those are often related to market failures and inception of oligopoly. Furthermore we devote to oligopoly models, which show how to reach equilibrium. The fundamental goal for this thesis is to analyze Czech banking industry and to prove the fact that it works under oligopoly structures. In order to prove these oligopoly structures we have to demonstrate that Czech banks reach extraordinary profits. In oligopoly a bigger bank should reach greater relative profit, which we deeply analyze. For measuring and proving oligopoly power we use procedures that are usually being used by European Central Bank. Most importantly it is the share of five largest banking institutions or Herfindahl-Hirschman index. These figures we also compare with foreign countries and try to find reliance of oligopoly power on the size of the country. In that order we choose countries that are more likely to form stronger oligopoly structures. The main objective of this thesis is to prove than banks are achieving extraordinary profits in Czech banking industry and emphasize the fact that banks holds the upper hand over clients.
|
|
| |
|
|
Why Does the Instant Food Consumption Decline? Analysis of Demand Determinants
Pazdera, Martin ; Koubek, Ivo (advisor) ; Špecián, Petr (referee)
There has been a significant decline in instant food market. I investigate the determinants of demand for instant food in this thesis. Oligopoly market structure motivates me to investigate the demand for instant food produced by particular firm. I use yearly and quarterly scanner data for instant food sales on the retail market in Czech Republic in the empirical part of the thesis. The yearly data analysis finds healthy diet trend as a possible cause of instant food market decline. According to quarterly data analysis I find instant food as an inferior good with income elasticity -0,6295. Both these factors can affect stagnant or decreasing revenues of instant food producers. Analysis of demand for instant food produced by particular firm illustrates strong relation between demanded quantity of producer's instant food and prices of his own and competing production. This indicates that price increase is not an optimal strategy in order to stabilize revenues of instant food producer.
|
|
|
Vliv nekooperativního oligopolu bankovního sektoru na jeho procyklikalitu
Tisoň, David
Neracionální jednání bank v době ekonomického ochlazení ve formě nezdravé redukce úvěrů pro reálnou ekonomiku se stalo v poslední době diskutovaným tématem. Podle dostupných studií může být následkem předešlých nadměrných úvěrových expanzí v době ekonomické prosperity. Následné superkonzervativní jednání bankovního sektoru může naopak prodlužovat ekonomickou depresi se zpětnými efekty do úvěrových portfolií bank. Zda-li je toto neracionální jednání optimální z hlediska inteligentního hráče z teorií her, je předmětem této analýzy. Studie popisuje tento fenomén pomocí několika modelů teorií her z nichž ústřední je Bayesovská hra, která modeluje prostředí konfliktní situace s nedokonalými informacemi. Výsledek implikuje, že dominantní bankovní strategií bez ohledu na jednání ostatních hráčů, je právě agresivní strategie s nízkou averzí k riziku a tedy volba rizikovějšího, nicméně potenciálně výnosnějšího portfolia v době ekonomické prosperity. Toto řešení však není Paretooptimální. Příčinou tohoto jednání je neznalost informací o portfoliové strategii ostatních hráčů a jejich vzájemná rivalita v navýšení tržního podílu. Tedy vedle již známých příčin procyklikality, vstupuje do hry taktéž rivalita oligopolistů. Závěr práce nabízí východisko v podobě otevřených bankovních kartelů (kooperujícího oligopolu) za účelem koordinace strategie. Cílem by byla volba vhodné úvěrové expanze celého bankovního sektoru (vice versa úvěrové restrikce)s přijatelným ziskem a rizikem pro banky a únosnými podmínkami pro dlužníky vhodné pro dané stádium ekonomického cyklu.
Fulltext:  PDF
|
|
|
The influence of oligopolistic structure on the performance of banking system from the point of game theory
Tisoň, David
The paper tries to grasp the phenomenon of procyclical behavior of oligopolistic banking sector using game theory models. The simulation is based on a Bayesian game that models the environment of a conflict situation with imperfect information. The result implies that the dominant bank strategy, regardless of the actions of other players, is very aggressive strategy with low risk aversion and therefore the choice of riskier and potentially more profitable portfolio in times of economic prosperity. In addition to the known causes of procyclicality comes into play also the oligopolist rivalry. Conclusion the paper provides is a starting point in the form of open banking cartels (co-operating oligopoly) to coordinate strategy. The goal may be appropriate choice of credit expansion of the banking system (credit restrictions vice versa) with an acceptable profit and risk for banks and manageable terms for borrowers suitable for the economic cycle.
Fulltext: PDF
|
|
|
Aplikace princípů teorie her v oligopolním prostředí
Strážnický, Matúš ; Hořejší, Bronislava (advisor) ; Fantová Šumpíková, Markéta (referee)
The goals of the master thesis are describing the strategic oligopoly environment of chosen industry of Czech telecommunications, together with introducing basic game theory principles with their possible real case application. It mentions historical shifts in Czech telecommunications sector which influence the actual industry conditions. The thesis briefly describes the individual players in the market and turns its attention towards the industry characterization through standard oligopoly models. Following, it introduces theoretical insight on possible market entry strategies into oligopoly industries. The application part focuses on game-theory in pricing strategies, market entry and entry deterring scenarios with examples. Final part summarizes the objectives in detail and provides final comments on the thesis.
|
|
|
Electricity market model of the Czech Republic
Kubát, Jan ; Pelikán, Jan (advisor) ; Kodera, Jan (referee) ; Marvan, Miroslav (referee)
A competitive electricity market has been established in many European countries including the Czech Republic. The electricity market includes a limited number of significant producers and traders, which can be described by oligopoly model. Since the electricity transmission and distribution are regulated, I consider two types of players performing in the electricity market: producers of electricity and traders, who buy electricity from producers and sell it to final customers. I derive oligopoly model with producers and traders "a la Cournot" and calculate a formula of equilibrium strategies. I use these theoretical findings to build a dynamic oligopoly model Ele. Ele is formulated as a mixed complementary problem and calibrated on data for the Czech Republic and neighbor states for several scenarios. The model was specified and calculated in GAMS software by the PATH solver. The results represent a Nash equilibrium. That means for individual producers: electricity generation, investment in new power plants construction and emission permits purchases. For traders the results are: equilibrium purchases, sales and cross-border transfers of electricity in each particular time period. Ele derives also equilibrium regional wholesale and retail electricity prices, emission permit prices and prices of cross-border auctions. Ele results point to an economic profitability of new nuclear power plants constructions. Further, I formulate a game in short-term electricity market, where I advise to Czech market participants, subjects of settlement, how much and in which circumstances to buy or sell electricity. Equilibrium results obtained through simulations based on the principle of a fictive game show that the current payment system of imbalance in the Czech Republic does not increase the risk of instability of electricity networks.
|
guest ::
