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Leniency programmes and private enforcement of cartel law
Kocí, Miloš ; Král, Richard (advisor) ; Petr, Michal (referee) ; Šmejkal, Václav (referee)
Leniency programmes and private enforcement of cartel law The available data suggests that there is an indisputable correlation between the declining attractivity of the leniency programme of the European Commission on the one hand, and the recent boom of private enforcement of cartel law on the other. It seems that in the past few years companies have become demotivated to submit leniency applications, which leads to a lower level of cartel detection and ultimately results in the weakening of both the public and private pillars of cartel law enforcement. This thesis focuses on areas that have not yet been sufficiently clarified by legislation and case-law and that are - when it comes to follow-on proceedings dealing with damages claims, held before national courts - associated with substantial risks for potential leniency applicants: (i) establishing of jurisdiction of national courts in the proceedings on claims for damages caused by anticompetitive conduct, (ii) protection of confidential information within the framework of hybrid settlements with the European Commission and in the proceedings before national courts, (iii) interpretation and application of presumptions of the existence and amount of harm caused by anticompetitive conduct and (iv) determination of the amount of harm caused by...
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Leniency programmes and private enforcement of corporate group law in the EU
Kocí, Miloš ; Zemánek, Jiří (advisor) ; Šmejkal, Václav (referee)
The relationship between private and public enforcement of cartel law has been heavily discussed in the recent years, both in legal doctrine and political circles. The European Commission has come up with various initiatives in order to promote and support changes in the legal orders of the EU Member States, which would make the private enforcement of cartel law easier and more accessible, especially for consumers, but for other subjects impaired by the violation of competition rules as well. However, this effort needs to be balanced with the existing system of public enforcement, notably with the established and well-funcioning leniency programmes. A strenghtened "private pillar" must not cause any damage to the exisitng "public pillar". Can private enforcement be an efficient complement to the hitherto system (predominantly public), and if so, where are the limits of it? On one hand, the support of private enforcement could discourage cartelists to participate in the leniency programmes, because the possible economic benefits (exemption from fines) might not outweigh the losses (huge amounts paid on damages in connection with follow-on actions). On the other hand, it has been argued that private enforcement is deeply underdeveloped in the European Union and no ideas of the European Commission drawing...
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