Eseje o důsledcích ohraničeného racionalita k výběru

Mikhalishchev, Sergei

In the first chapter, we introduce a new role of quotas, e.g., labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effects of quota implementation on the attention allo- cation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) manager. We find that quotas induce attention: a RI manager who is forced to fulfill a quota, unlike an unrestricted RI man- ager, never rejects minority candidates without acquiring information about them. We also demonstrate that, in our model, quotas are behaviorally equivalent to subsidies. We further analyze different goals that the social planner can achieve by implementing quo- tas. First, quotas can eliminate statistical discrimination, i.e., make chances of being hired independent from group identity. Second, when the hiring manager has inaccurate beliefs about the distribution of candidates' productivities, the social planner can make the manager behave as if she has correct beliefs. Finally, we show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidates. In the second chapter, we study the information choice of exchange-traded funds (ETF) investors, and its impact on the price efficiency of underlying stocks. First, we show that the learning of stock-specific information happens at the ETF level. Further, our results suggest...

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