Original title: Pexeso ("Concentration game") as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models
Authors: Kuběna, Aleš Antonín
Document type: Papers
Conference/Event: 28-th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics, České Budějovice (CZ), 2010-09-08 / 2010-09-10
Year: 2010
Language: eng
Abstract: Among board games, Pexeso (Concentration game) for two players is a game almost purely output-oriented, i.e. the optimal play is not given by strategic plans with long-term horizon (e.g. no short-term tactical sacrifice is observed). So, the optimal strategy and game dynamics may be calculated almost analytically, assuming a given rationality restrictions of the players. In the paper, the optimal strategy for two players is solved using dynamic programming. Further, it is proved that for rational players, the game would end with ”stalemate” (the game never ends) with a probability close to 1. Further, the game dynamics is described if a rationality restriction is given such that the players perform a random move instead of the optimal one with probabilities P,Q > 0. In this case, the probability of a stalemate is equal to zero.
Keywords: Concentration game; perfect players; pexeso
Project no.: CEZ:AV0Z10750506 (CEP), GD402/09/H045 (CEP)
Funding provider: GA ČR
Host item entry: Proceedings of the 28th International Conference on Mathematical Methods in Economics 2010, ISBN 978-80-7394-218-2

Institution: Institute of Information Theory and Automation AS ČR (web)
Document availability information: Fulltext is available at external website.
External URL: http://library.utia.cas.cz/separaty/2010/E/kubena-pexeso (concentration game) as an arbiter of bounded-rationality models.pdf
Original record: http://hdl.handle.net/11104/0188542

Permalink: http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-41733


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