Cheating Behavior in Football

Selep, Ján

In this thesis I provide statistical evidence documenting rigging of football matches in German long-term championship Bundesliga. For the purpose I use 8326 matches played in top three German long-term competitions through years 1995 -- 2012. The championship is based on a point collection in a standings table divided by strict success margins, e.g. title or relegation. The margins lead to a non-linear incentive structure in which one point is worth more for teams close to the margin. Uncertainty about the final outcome, however, postpones the equilibrating effect to the last rounds of a season. I find evidence of increased point earnings as a reaction on relegation margin closeness at the end of a season. Increased effort of the marginal teams cannot explain the findings as players exert no better performance in the incentive situation. In the same time, their opponents with long margin distance decrease their performance. In addition to that I provide evidence on cheating cooperation proxied by variance of players' performance. The variance does not react on the incentive situation suggesting that teammates behave unitedly. Performance of referees seems to exert stable performance with no reaction on teams' incentives. Overall, the results show strong evidence of systemic point trading in German Bundesliga.

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