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How matching grants and their size affect behaviour and where
Caisl, Jakub ; Bauer, Michal (advisor) ; Štika, Pavel (referee)
In this work we focus on a large scale randomized field experiment described in Karlan & List(2007). Using direct mail solicitations to more than 50000 prior donors of a large U.S. non-profit organization, they examine the effects of matching grants on behaviour. They describe the effects of the matching grants in general, for the whole population, and find that matching grant size has no impact on behaviour. We use a different approach, dividing the population into subgroups by income and education and then measuring the effects of matching grant size on donating behaviour in these subgroups. We find significant heterogenity in the effects of grant size on behaviour. Also we try to apply the theory of social identity when interpreting the effects of matching grants.
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Cooperation with incomplete monitoring
Caisl, Jakub ; Bauer, Michal (advisor) ; Červinka, Michal (referee)
We approach the topic of provision of public goods in an experimental economic study using the Public Goods Game setting. We allow subjects to punish each other but vary the structure and amount of information they can base their decisions upon. We try to add to the current literature on reciprocity and study whether people are willing to punish under such incomplete information. Since punishment under uncertain conditions can be quite destructive in terms of welfare, this closely relates to whether people are able to provide public good themselves or whether they need some external assistance. In terms of public policy, this can add to the debate on when should government provide certain services and when it should be left to individuals. In terms of behaviour inside of an enterprise, our study could be well applied to problems that arise when teams work on a common project but some people free-ride on effort of others.
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How matching grants and their size affect behaviour and where
Caisl, Jakub ; Štika, Pavel (referee) ; Bauer, Michal (advisor)
In this work we focus on a large scale randomized field experiment described in Karlan & List(2007). Using direct mail solicitations to more than 50000 prior donors of a large U.S. non-profit organization, they examine the effects of matching grants on behaviour. They describe the effects of the matching grants in general, for the whole population, and find that matching grant size has no impact on behaviour. We use a different approach, dividing the population into subgroups by income and education and then measuring the effects of matching grant size on donating behaviour in these subgroups. We find significant heterogenity in the effects of grant size on behaviour. Also we try to apply the theory of social identity when interpreting the effects of matching grants.
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