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Political business cycle and public procurements in regional municipalities
Březinová, Zuzana ; Pavel, Jan (advisor) ; Kučerová, Zuzana (referee)
The theme of this bachelor thesis is analysis of the political business cycle at public procurements in twelve regional municipalities in the Czech Republic. Two hypotheses are tested, one of which relates to oportunistic behaviour of incumbents, and the other one to corruption. Four quantities, at which course from January 2005 to March 2011 is observed, are tested here. These quantities are number of public procurements, total amout of public procurements, average number of bids to one procurement and proportion of final and expected prices. Each of these quantities is observed separately for public procurements for goods, deliveries and services. Regression analysis is used for testing. The result of this thesis is that political business cycle occured before election in 2006 at public procurements for goods and deliveries.
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Political Business Cycle and Public Procurements in Prague
Drzková, Petra ; Pavel, Jan (advisor) ; Holubářová, Jana (referee)
The aim of this bachelor thesis is to reveal whether there is a relation between public procurements and the political business cycle in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic. The examined data cover a period from the year 2005 to 2011. Two hypotheses have been set in order to discover whether there is such a relation. The first one postulates that the public procurements are used on constructions, well visible investments, so as to increase the probability of being re-elected. The second hypothesis marks the effort of politicians to maximize their own benefits till the end of electoral term as the main reason for contracting public procurements. The hypotheses are proved separately for constructions and for supplies and services by the number of public procurements, the total amount of money spent on public procurements in a particular term, by average amount of bids and by the relate of the end and assumed price. The regression analysis was used as a tool of verification. The result is a determination if it is possible to find such a relation dependance of public procurements and political business cycle in Prague and what is assumed to be the main motive.
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The Analysis of Hungarian Indebtedness after 1989
Kudláček, Jan ; Petrášek, František (advisor) ; Vokoun, Marek (referee)
Hungary has struggled with budget problems throughout its post-socialist history. With knowledge of economic theory it is possible to analyze the evolution of Hungary's debt after 1989 and thus deduce its weaknesses. Populism and fiscal irresponsibility have characterized majority of Hungarian governments to some extent. Hence, the key to understanding the debt of Hungary may be found on the political level of budgetary policy. With regard to the economic situation, Hungary was forced to implement significant cost-saving measures in recent years. These measures are evaluated at the end of the work. They can be crucial not only in terms of the budgetary situation but also with respect to the perspective on the future economic development and competitiveness of the entire economy.
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Political business cycle and public procurements at regional authorities
Jelínková, Lenka ; Pavel, Jan (advisor) ; Holubářová, Jana (referee)
This bachelor thesis examines the political business cycle at public procurements, which were submitted by 13 regional authorities in the Czech Republic from September 2004 till June 2010. Two hypotheses are tested here. According the first one, the incumbents try to increase the probability of re-election by visible investments, e.g. public procurements for buildings. The second hypothesis supposes that the incumbents are afraid of not being re-elected. Therefore they strive for maximizing their personal profit from the office. Regression analysis is used for testing. Public procurements for buildings are tested separately from public procurements for goods and services. The number of public procurements, total amount and the average number of bidders are tested for each group of public procurements. The result is a detection of different motives in different parts of political business cycle.
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