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NATO's Challenge: Exploring the Persistence of the Alliance's Military Capabilities Gap
Schwarzenberg, Carly Eileen ; Karásek, Tomáš (advisor) ; Kučera, Tomáš (referee)
This thesis addresses the military capabilities gap between the US and European member states of NATO. It seeks to answer the question, why does the US-European capabilities gap persist despite apparent agreement between Allies on strategic capabilities objectives and cooperative solutions? The paper first establishes the need for a strong, independent European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, particularly since NATO's operations in Libya. It then defines and explicates the military capabilities gap within the Alliance, including its scope, history, and attempts to find cooperative solutions. This analysis demonstrates that there is broad agreement both on what the Alliance requires for military capabilities and for how best to obtain them (cooperatively), yet the gap has persisted and grown for two decades. In an attempt to solve this empirical puzzle, the paper employs a two-level games framework to analyze the NATO defense planning process, which links supranational capabilities planning for the Alliance to national-level execution, dependent upon funding from state parliaments. Faced with the general answer that fiscal constraints preclude states from following through on their commitments, the paper delves deeper to determine factors that may influence differences in defense...
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NATO's Challenge: Exploring the Persistence of the Alliance's Military Capabilities Gap
Schwarzenberg, Carly Eileen ; Karásek, Tomáš (advisor) ; Kučera, Tomáš (referee)
This thesis addresses the military capabilities gap between the US and European member states of NATO. It seeks to answer the question, why does the US-European capabilities gap persist despite apparent agreement between Allies on strategic capabilities objectives and cooperative solutions? The paper first establishes the need for a strong, independent European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, particularly since NATO's operations in Libya. It then defines and explicates the military capabilities gap within the Alliance, including its scope, history, and attempts to find cooperative solutions. This analysis demonstrates that there is broad agreement both on what the Alliance requires for military capabilities and for how best to obtain them (cooperatively), yet the gap has persisted and grown for two decades. In an attempt to solve this empirical puzzle, the paper employs a two-level games framework to analyze the NATO defense planning process, which links supranational capabilities planning for the Alliance to national-level execution, dependent upon funding from state parliaments. Faced with the general answer that fiscal constraints preclude states from following through on their commitments, the paper delves deeper to determine factors that may influence differences in defense...
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Application of Game Theory on Decision Making in UN Security Council
Rozsypal, Jakub ; Parízek, Michal (advisor) ; Halás, Matúš (referee)
Bachelor thesis Application of Game Theory on Decision Making in the UN Security Council quantitatively examines decisions of permanent Security Council members in the period between 1985 and February 2011. In the first part, theoretical framework of game theory as such is described. In the second part, formal functioning of the Security Council is explained with emphasis on vetoing. In the third part, the model itself is formulated. It is based especially on the model of Two-Level Games of J.Putnam and also the Strategic Perspective. Permanent members of the Security Council are categorized according to their degree of democracy/autocracy into three types. These types are then assigned to corresponding states. A mechanism is then developed that accounts for both gains on the domestic level as well as international level. The thesis postulates that because states have different mechanisms of acquiring utility, the trends in Security Council voting will be different. Statistical analysis of the data follows and shows a considerable dependence between type of the actor and usage of the veto. Democratic type is more likely to use the veto power than the other types. This persists even if accounted for uneven distribution of different types in the Security Council.
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