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The legacy of philosophical behaviourism: the concept of mind without minds
Soutor, Milan ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
The epistemological problem of unity and its development in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell is the main subject of this essay. The first chapter is devoted to naïve realism developed by G. E. Moore and adopted by early Russell. I explain the notion of objective unity of proposition. The second chapter concerns Russell's departure from naïve realism and the multiple relation of judgment which Wittgenstein's criticism rendered as fatally unable to handle the problem of synthetic unity. The breakdown of this theory led Russell to naturalism, which is the topic of the last chapter. I pay special attention to the regressive argument proposed in slightly different versions by Moore, L. Wittgenstein and G. Ryle. Keywords realism, neutral monism, behaviorism, unity, consciousness
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Use of computer simulations in medical education
Hübnerová, Iveta ; Šisler, Vít (advisor) ; Slussareff, Michaela (referee)
The diploma thesis deals with the method of using computer simulations in education, with a focus on medicine. It also presents possible usage of computer simulations in other fields. The thesis presents possible usage of computer simulation to support the education, analyses of effective approaches and possible barriers that may arise during the implementation. Practical research is based on qualitative analysis of current situation of using simulations at medical faculties in the Czech republic. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
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The legacy of philosophical behaviourism: the concept of mind without minds
Soutor, Milan ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee)
The epistemological problem of unity and its development in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell is the main subject of this essay. The first chapter is devoted to naïve realism developed by G. E. Moore and adopted by early Russell. I explain the notion of objective unity of proposition. The second chapter concerns Russell's departure from naïve realism and the multiple relation of judgment which Wittgenstein's criticism rendered as fatally unable to handle the problem of synthetic unity. The breakdown of this theory led Russell to naturalism, which is the topic of the last chapter. I pay special attention to the regressive argument proposed in slightly different versions by Moore, L. Wittgenstein and G. Ryle. Keywords realism, neutral monism, behaviorism, unity, consciousness
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