National Repository of Grey Literature 4 records found  Search took 0.01 seconds. 
Specifics of concepts of ethics of virtues in Confucianism and traditional Aristotelianism
STLUKOVÁ, Kateřina
The Nicomachean Ethics and Analects are the founding texts of the ethics of European and Asian continents. This text discusses the basic concepts of both ethics, presents the concept of virtue in both the Aristotelian and Confucian traditions, and introduces the reader to the issue of the incommensurability of these concepts.
Who is Afraid of Being Smart?
Chvatík, Ivan
Although the dialogue is formally aporetical, this paper argues that Plato succeeded in grapsing – between the lines – the phronesis Charmides is looking for. However, this is not possible by means of a definition, since phronesis is neither a thing nor substantial knowledge. It seems to be a sort of self-reference, an ability to project one’s acting in unpredictable situations, to judge if something was done well or wrong, to consider what one knows and what not. Hence phronesis is the ability which precedes and makes any knowledge possible and without which nobody can act well and be happy. In this sense the phronesis of this dialogue is closely connected with the Platonic concept of the good and has much in common with the Platonic concept of human "immortality".
Why to Go to Study with Euthydemus?
Chvatík, Ivan
The paper attempts to show that the purpose of the Euthydemus is not to ridicule the sophist’s art of disputation, but rather to point out the problems which serious philosophical dialectics encounters in the very essence of language, especially as concerns initiating others into this highest of all human activities. As the author sees it, the dialogue denies the possibility of teaching philosophy as the supreme human virtue and way to bliss, while explaining the paradoxical characteristics of such a virtue. This special virtue, i.e. human rationality (phronesis), is inherent in human beings; one cannot learn it extrinsically, but merely cultivate it as such. The author finally suggests further consideration of whether Plato’s concept of phronesis can be identified with his idea of the Good.
Polytropos Odysseus, polytropoteros Hippias, polytropotatos Sokrates
Chvatík, Ivan
The paper attempts to figure out the message of the dialogue from its text alone, without recurring to other dialogues or to an "unwritten doctrine". Socrates defeats Hippias in the discussion not by a superiority in positive knowledge but by his wits. He implicitly shows the reader that it is wrong to believe with Hippias that the morality of the character would be an ability of the kind of a positive knowledge. The message of the dialogue results in understanding that the human wit is more than knowledge, makes it possible, and enables us to use it morally well or evil. It is wit which makes us human, not knowledge.

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