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K čemu vede (ne)transparentnost veřejných zakázek?
Palguta, Ján ; Pertold, Filip
V roce 2006 byl zaveden zjednodušený režim zadávání veřejných zakázek cestou podlimitních řízení. Cílem bylo umožnit flexibilnější a jednodušší způsob zadávání menších zakázek. Změna však začala omezovat ekonomickou soutěž, transparentnost a nabídla zneužitelnou volnost zadavatelům. Původně zavedený horní limit pro realizaci tzv. podlimitních stavebních zakázek na úrovni 20 milionů Kč byl proto v roce 2012 snížen na polovinu. Zavedení limitů vedlo, mimo jiné, k manipulacím s odhadovanými hodnotami zakázek a k umělému „nafukování“ cen zakázek směrem k cenovému limitu. Nejčastější výskyt těchto jevů bylo možno sledovat v sektoru stavebnictví. S rostoucím objemem zakázky a s přibližováním odhadovaných hodnot k zákonnému limitu roste neefektivita, tj. rozdíl mezi vysoutěženou a odhadovanou cenou. Rozdíl představuje až 15 procentních bodů oproti otevřenému řízení.
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Rent-seeking in public procurement: evidence from the entry of political challengers at electoral thresholds
Palguta, Ján
This paper shows that political challengers affect rent-seeking in public procurement. I use data from municipal governments in the Czech Republic to construct new measures of political rent-seeking in procurement and test whether the entry of additional challengers into municipal legislatures affects the rent-seeking practices. Because the entry of challengers is endogenous to the performance of incumbents, I predict the challenger entry using quasi-random variation in the vote share of challengers near the threshold in proportional elections. I show that legislatures with additional challengers allocate fewer procurements to political donors, double price savings in procurement and use more competitive procurement auctions. The entry of extra challengers leads to greater economic benefits in legislatures with fewer political parties and in legislatures entered by local-level political movements. My findings highlight the role of local-level movements in enhancing political accountability and the value of monitoring the behavior of politicians.
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Concealed ownership of contractors, manipulation of tenders and the allocation of public procurement contracts
Palguta, Ján
This study provides evidence of a strong link between two channels facilitating rent-extraction in public procurement: between concealing the ultimate ownership of contractors and manipulation of the anticipated value of tenders. Using data on more than 15 300 tenders awarded to joint-stock companies in the Czech Republic during 2005 - 2010, the study shows that tender value manipulation has been incentivized by the 2006 procurement reform, which extablished several discontinuities in the anticipated value of tenders.
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Nonlinear incentive schemes and corruption in public procurement: evidence from the Czech Republic
Palguta, Ján
This article uses data on Czech public procurement contracts from 2005 - 2010 in order to uncover patterns suggestive of corrupt behavior of procuring officials. Using polynomial regressions and local linear density estimators, the article provides evidence that procurement officials manipulate anticipated values of procurements so that contracts can be awarded through less transparent procedures with restricted entry. Manipulations manifest through emergence of sharp discontinuities in the anticipated value distribution. Procurements excessively bunch below statutory thresholds, which determine officials’ scope of discretion, entry-restrictiveness and transparency of the contract-awarding process.
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MARKET FOR ATTENTION: CONSEQUENCES OF INFORMATIONAL GAPS ON PERFORMANCE OF MASS MEDIA
Palguta, Ján ; Tegze, Miron (vedoucí práce) ; Kollar, Miroslav (oponent)
In my dissertation I examine the mutual relationship between a company in mass media market and its customers, where the company enjoys an informational advantage over its customers about the quality of the provided information goods. The mass media companies compete for customers? attention, i.e. for the total number of watchers, readers, subscribers, etc., because that determines their profits. The document analyses the market mechanisms under information asymmetry and adds to the standard analysis of supply and demand the notion on the quality of the exchanged service. The principal aim of this work is to economically explain the contemporary trends of scandal-mongering, sensationalism, unprofessional and unethical practices in the mass media market and by the reputation theory describe the behaviour of companies trying to protect their goodwill. The work comments on the welfare implications of the existing market structure and it suggests procedures available for overcoming of the information asymmetry.
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Market for attention: consequences of informational gaps on performance of mass media
Palguta, Ján ; Tegze, Miron (vedoucí práce) ; Kollár, Miroslav (oponent)
In my dissertation I examine the mutual relationship between a company in mass media market and its customers, where the company enjoys an informational advantage over its customers about the quality of the provided information goods. The mass media companies compete for customers? attention, i.e. for the total number of watchers, readers, subscribers, etc., because that determines their profits. The document analyses the market mechanisms under information asymmetry and adds to the standard analysis of supply and demand the notion on the quality of the exchanged service. The principal aim of this work is to economically explain the contemporary trends of scandal-mongering, sensationalism, unprofessional and unethical practices in the mass media market and by the reputation theory describe the behaviour of companies trying to protect their goodwill. The work comments on the welfare implications of the existing market structure and it suggests procedures available for overcoming of the information asymmetry.
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