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Security of Contactless Smart Card Protocols
Henzl, Martin ; Rosa, Tomáš (oponent) ; Staudek, Jan (oponent) ; Hanáček, Petr (vedoucí práce)
This thesis analyses contactless smart card protocol threats and presents a method of semi-automated vulnerability finding in such protocols using model checking. Designing and implementing secure applications is difficult even when secure hardware is used. High level application specifications may lead to different implementations. It is important to use the smart card correctly, inappropriate protocol implementation may introduce a vulnerability, even if the protocol is secure by itself. The goal of this thesis is to provide a method that can be used by protocol developers to create a model of arbitrary smart card, with focus on contactless smart cards, to create a model of the protocol, and to use model checking to find attacks in this model. The attack can be then executed and if not successful, the model is refined for another model checker run. The AVANTSSAR platform was used for the formal verification, models are written in the ASLan++ language. Examples are provided to demonstrate usability of the proposed method. This method was used to find a weakness of Mifare DESFire contactless smart card. This thesis also deals with threats not possible to cover by the proposed method, such as relay attacks.
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Security of Contactless Smart Card Protocols
Henzl, Martin ; Rosa, Tomáš (oponent) ; Staudek, Jan (oponent) ; Hanáček, Petr (vedoucí práce)
This thesis analyses contactless smart card protocol threats and presents a method of semi-automated vulnerability finding in such protocols using model checking. Designing and implementing secure applications is difficult even when secure hardware is used. High level application specifications may lead to different implementations. It is important to use the smart card correctly, inappropriate protocol implementation may introduce a vulnerability, even if the protocol is secure by itself. The goal of this thesis is to provide a method that can be used by protocol developers to create a model of arbitrary smart card, with focus on contactless smart cards, to create a model of the protocol, and to use model checking to find attacks in this model. The attack can be then executed and if not successful, the model is refined for another model checker run. The AVANTSSAR platform was used for the formal verification, models are written in the ASLan++ language. Examples are provided to demonstrate usability of the proposed method. This method was used to find a weakness of Mifare DESFire contactless smart card. This thesis also deals with threats not possible to cover by the proposed method, such as relay attacks.
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