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Game Theoretic Modelling of the International Relations System
Halás, Matúš ; Drulák, Petr (advisor) ; Plechanovová, Běla (referee) ; Křivan, Vlastimil (referee)
The thesis models interactions in the system of states. Fundamental research question asked what consequences for success of strategies and prospects of cooperative behavior have particular settings and properties of the system. Thesis includes two features peculiar to international relations that did not appear anywhere else before: (i) determination of interaction occurrence with help of distance and power; and (ii) emergence of (dis)trust out of the previous interactions. The model is based on three elements: agents, environment, and rules. Players interacted in the Hobbesian Prisoner's Dilemma environment as described by realists, but thanks to payoff shift representing emergence of (dis)trust I also formalized constructivist argument of different cultures of anarchy and of mutually constitutive agent-structure relationship. Multi-agent computer simulations set within the abductive reasoning framework were chosen because lack of heterogeneous enough data and impossibility of experiments made this data generating method a necessity. The source code is written in C#. I translated 62 Axelrod's behavioral rules and then added several others that seemed promising. Three new strategies mirroring usual behavior of states were proposed too. To secure robustness of the results, application was run...
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Reasons for U.S. veto in the United Nations Security Council on behalf of Israel, 1972-1997
Hlaváčová, Lenka ; Přikryl, Pavel (advisor) ; Halás, Matúš (referee)
The aim of this thesis is to define the reasons of the U.S veto on behalf of Israel in the United Nations Security Council through analysis of the drafted resolutions. Author presents the resolutions vetoed by the U.S. on Israel in 1972-1997. The analysis focuses on four fields: who proposes the resoltutions, what is the subject of the resotutions, what language is used in the resultions, and what is the stance of the U.S. Representative to UN. Author states that the sponsors of the resolutions aren't relevant for the U.S. decision-making. Author rather supports the opinion that the language used and the intention to solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict by the UN SC are most probably the reasons for the U.S veto. The unbalancedness of the resoltuions (in the U.S. Understanding) is also one of the causes of the veto. U.S is refusing to condemn Israel in UN SC resolutions and it is trying to have the Arab-Israeli conflict solved by the parties involved and not by the third party who would impose the conditions of the settlement.
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Application of Game Theory on Decision Making in UN Security Council
Rozsypal, Jakub ; Parízek, Michal (advisor) ; Halás, Matúš (referee)
Bachelor thesis Application of Game Theory on Decision Making in the UN Security Council quantitatively examines decisions of permanent Security Council members in the period between 1985 and February 2011. In the first part, theoretical framework of game theory as such is described. In the second part, formal functioning of the Security Council is explained with emphasis on vetoing. In the third part, the model itself is formulated. It is based especially on the model of Two-Level Games of J.Putnam and also the Strategic Perspective. Permanent members of the Security Council are categorized according to their degree of democracy/autocracy into three types. These types are then assigned to corresponding states. A mechanism is then developed that accounts for both gains on the domestic level as well as international level. The thesis postulates that because states have different mechanisms of acquiring utility, the trends in Security Council voting will be different. Statistical analysis of the data follows and shows a considerable dependence between type of the actor and usage of the veto. Democratic type is more likely to use the veto power than the other types. This persists even if accounted for uneven distribution of different types in the Security Council.
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Game Theoretic Modelling of the International Relations System
Halás, Matúš ; Drulák, Petr (advisor) ; Plechanovová, Běla (referee) ; Křivan, Vlastimil (referee)
The thesis models interactions in the system of states. Fundamental research question asked what consequences for success of strategies and prospects of cooperative behavior have particular settings and properties of the system. Thesis includes two features peculiar to international relations that did not appear anywhere else before: (i) determination of interaction occurrence with help of distance and power; and (ii) emergence of (dis)trust out of the previous interactions. The model is based on three elements: agents, environment, and rules. Players interacted in the Hobbesian Prisoner's Dilemma environment as described by realists, but thanks to payoff shift representing emergence of (dis)trust I also formalized constructivist argument of different cultures of anarchy and of mutually constitutive agent-structure relationship. Multi-agent computer simulations set within the abductive reasoning framework were chosen because lack of heterogeneous enough data and impossibility of experiments made this data generating method a necessity. The source code is written in C#. I translated 62 Axelrod's behavioral rules and then added several others that seemed promising. Three new strategies mirroring usual behavior of states were proposed too. To secure robustness of the results, application was run...
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