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Efficiency of public spending
Lebovič, Michal ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Krištoufek, Ladislav (referee)
This thesis aims to offer a comprehensive introduction into the topic of efficiency measurement in the public sector. Firstly, usual definitions and concepts of efficiency are introduced. Attention is then turned to the description of various factors and problems specific for public sector that are crucial to efficiency measurement. It is shown that these factors preclude the use of general (private sector) efficiency measurement methods or demand their modification. The most common methods of analysis are then introduced and their relative advantages and disadvantages in the environment of public sector are explained. Finally the thesis outlines the possible uses and benefits of efficiency measurement, including the use in the economic policy-making, but also points out the limits inherent to this analysis in the current stage of development.
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Effective tax rate measures : (survey of methods, computations and comparison to statutory tax rates in the Czech Republic)
Kábrtová, Jana ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Hedbávný, Petr (referee)
Structure of tax systems of particular countries across the world features with great complexity and largely differ from one country to another. Statutory tax rates are not a good measure of the tax burden imposed by the tax nor are they a good tool for comparing of different tax systems or analysing the effects of changes in tax laws. To gather all these information we need to construct synthetic indicators as effective tax rates that are the main subject of this thesis. The effective tax rates can be calculated using several different methods. The first part of this thesis describes and summarizes these methods of computation of effective tax rates and points its strengths and weaknesses. The second part of the thesis then bases on my own effective tax rate's computations and compares effective tax rates in the Czech Republic with effective tax rates in Europe. The aim of this part is to find out whether the final tax burden in the Czech Republic is higher or lower than in EU-15 countries. Moreover I compare the effective tax rates with the statutory ones and describe the features of Czech tax system. The last part of the thesis is talking about the proposed tax reform with focus on the impact of this reform to effective tax rates.
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Life satisfaction : (empirical evidence from the Czech Republic)
Vágnerová, Markéta ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Mlčoch, Lubomír (referee)
Main goal of my bachelor theis is to investigate life satisfaction in the Czech Republic and find explanatory variables influencing it, with an emphasis on economic indicators. It strives to compare Czech Republic with other states of the European Union, especially in relationship to main macroeconomic indicators. Some of the explanatory variables are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 are models on life satisfaction on two datasets. The results of the models are compared according to a type of data and on dependence on used econometric Metod. One of the key questions is, how much money "buys" happiness (resp. In our case life satisfaction).
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The Efficiency of Public Expenditure, Evidence from the Czech Republic
Vraná, Veronika ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Schneider, Ondřej (referee)
1 Abstract Efficiency is an important concept for performance evaluation of decision- making units. This thesis studies efficiency of public spending and methods of its estimation. Firstly, a wide range of efficiency estimators are defined and compared. For the public spending efficiency analysis the most convenient es- timator is found to be the cost frontier approach of the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). The second part of the thesis contains efficiency analysis of public spending in the 14 regions of the Czech Republic in the years 2003-2014. For the analysis current expenditure of regional offices is used as the input. Based on the investigation of regional services output index is formed and employed in the analysis. The estimation is performed using the cost frontier approach of the SFA as the main method. Various other efficiency estimators are then applied to the data in order to study robustness of the results. The thesis further discusses relative ranking of the regions and time evolution of efficiency scores using different assumptions and variety of methods. Lastly, several potential effects on the estimated efficiency are considered and analysed. JEL Classification D24, H41, H72 Keywords efficiency, regions, public expenditure, Czech Republic Author's e-mail verca25.vrana@seznam.cz Supervisor's e-mail...
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Inattention, Hand-to-Mouth Behavior, and Poverty Trap
Koval, Pavel ; Matějka, Filip (advisor) ; Zápal, Jan (referee)
In this thesis, I study the hand-to-mouth behavior of the spoor that originates from inattentive savings behavior and leads to a poverty trap. I assume that in the rational inattention model people acquire costly information about stochastic permanent income and choose a savings plan. I hypothesize that in this context high information costs and low income variance may encourage poor agents to choose a rigid savings plan below an optimal level, persistently undersave, and get stuck in a poverty trap. I construct and solve the two-period rational inattention model of savings decisions. The results show that a poor agent chooses a rigid savings plan below an optimal level when information costs are high and income variance is low. I discuss avenues for future research that are based on solving an infinite-horizon model with rationally inattentive agents, provide the conditions under which a poverty trap occurs, and test the model on consumption-savings data. Keywords: information costs, hand-to-mouth behavior, poverty trap, savings plan
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Essays on Allocations in Two-Sided Markets
Šedek, Jan ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Miralles, Antonio (referee) ; Serena, Marco (referee)
Chapter 1 studies strategy-proofness in a congested market with asymmetric information and interdependences in players preferences. The market consists of players and depletable locations. Knowing about the asymmetries of in- formation and interdependences in preferences, the players choose one of two locations. In case of congestion, the rejected players are costlessly allocated to the other location. We show that, under correlated preferences, asymmetric information causes strategy-proofness to fail. We further provide a character- ization of strategy-proofness of the allocation mechanism. Finally, we provide several sufficient conditions for strategy-proofness including independence of preferences. Chapter 2 studies information acquisition incentives and welfare in a con- gested market with independent preferences. The players first learn about their preferences over two locations, after which they choose a location. In case of congestion, the rejected players are costlessly allocated to the other loca- tion. First, we show that for independent preferences, the allocation game with information acquisition tends to exhibit complementarities in information ac- quisition. This results in equilibrium multiplicity. Second, we show that due to prevailing positive externalities the equilibrium, in which more...
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Sequential vote buying
Chen, Y. ; Zápal, Jan
To enact a policy, a leader needs votes from committee members with heterogeneous opposition intensities. She sequentially offers transfers in exchange for votes. The transfers are either promises paid only if the policy passes or paid up front. With transfer promises, a vote costs nearly zero. With up-front payments, a vote can cost significantly more than zero, but the leader is better off with up-front payments. The leader does not necessarily buy the votes of those least opposed. The opposition structure most challenging to the leader involves either a homogeneous committee or a committee with two homogenous groups. Our results provide an explanation for several empirical regularities: lobbying of strongly opposed legislators, the Tullock Paradox and expansion of the whip system in the U.S. House concurrent with ideological homogenization of parties. We also discuss several extensions including private histories and simultaneous offers.
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The demand and supply of favours in dynamic relationships
Forand, J. G. ; Zápal, Jan
We characterise the optimal demand and supply of favours in a dynamic principal-agent model of joint production, in which heterogenous project opportunities arrive stochastically and are publicly observed upon arrival, utility from these projects is non-transferable and commitment to future production is limited. Our results characterise the optimal dynamic contract, and we establish that the principal’s supply of favours (the production of projects that benefit the agent but not the principal) is backloaded, that the principal’s demand for favours (the production of projects that benefit the principal but not the agent) is frontloaded, and that the production of projects is ordered by their comparative advantage, that is, by their associated efficiency in extracting (for demanded projects) and providing (for supplied projects) utility to the agent. Furthermore, we\nprovide an exact construction of the optimal contract when project opportunities follow a Markov process.
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A model of focusing in political choice
Nunnari, S. ; Zápal, Jan
This paper develops a theoretical model of voters’ and politicians’ behavior based on the notion that voters focus disproportionately on, and hence overweight, certain attributes of policies. We assume that policies have two attributes and that voters focus more on the attribute in which their options differ more. First, we consider exogenous policies and show that voters’ focusing polarizes the electorate. Second, we consider the endogenous supply of policies by office-motivated politicians\nwho take voters’ distorted focus into account. We show that focusing leads to inefficient policies, which cater excessively to a subset of voters: social groups that are larger, have more distorted focus, are more moderate, and are more sensitive to changes in a single attribute are more influential. Finally, we show that augmenting the classical models of voting and electoral competition with focusing can contribute to explain puzzling stylized facts as the inverse correlation between income inequality and redistribution or the backlash effect of extreme policies.
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