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Essays on Prediction and Betting Markets
Kálovcová, Katarína ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Blavatskyy, Pavlo (oponent) ; McKenzie, Jordi (oponent)
V posledních desetiletích došlo k výraznému nárustu zájmu o predikční a sázkové trhy (prediction and betting markets). Tento zájem byl vyvolán zejména jejich prokázaným potenciálem agregovat informace a schopností zpřesnit využívané predikční metody. V první kapitole této dizertační práce analyzujeme hlavní rozdíly mezi predikčními a sázkovými trhy, přičemž vyslovujeme domněnky o vlivu těchto rozdílů na výkonnost trhů. V druhé kapitole se zaměřujeme na proces agregace informací pomocí replikace experimentálního sázkového trhu uvedeného v publikaci Plott, Wit & Yang (2003). Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) prostřednictvím kurzů na jejich sázkovem trhu ukazují, že informace byly agregovány. Paradoxem je, že model založený pouze na používání soukromých informací vystihuje chování jednotlivých obchodníků nejlépe. Na rozdíl od analýzy agregátních dat, kterou zvolili Plott, Wit & Yang (2003), my analyzujeme data na úrovni jednotlivých obchodníků a vysvětlujeme tento paradox. V poslední kapitole uvádíme výsledky našeho interního predikčního trhu zorganizovaného na institutu CERGE-EI. Tento trh nám umožnil testovt známý, experimentálně ověřený mechanismus pro reálné vnitřní potřeby této instituce. V rámci tohoto experimentu jsme poukázali na fakt, že design a implementace predikčního trhu jsou nesmírně důležité...
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The Road to Efficient Liberalization of EU Energy Markets: Obstacles and Consequences
Mravec, Michal ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Kmenta, Jan (oponent) ; Roland, Gérard (oponent)
1 S ohledem na pomalý rozvoj konkurence na českém trhu se zemním plynem po jeho liberalizaci zkoumám dopad omezené konkurence na trhu producentů na trh domácích obchodníků. Rozšiřuji standardní Cournotovy modely konkurence a snažím se pochopit současný a možný budoucí vývoj po liberalizaci trhu v zemi, která má jen minimální vlastní produkci. Docházím k závěru, že producent může využít svoji sílu na trhu, přivlastnit si část přínosu liberalizace a zvýšit velkoobchodní ceny, což vede k nižšímu poklesu koncových cen po liberalizaci. Navíc tento nárůst velkoobchodních cen znesnadňuje vstup nových obchodníků s plynem. Tento problém lze zmírnit či kompletně odstranit, pokud současně s liberalizací domácího trhu dojde i k zvýšení konkurence na úrovni producentů. S důrazem na liberalizaci českého trhu se zemním plynem zkoumám, jak struktura skladování plynu může ovlivnit vývoj konkurence a ceny po liberalizaci trhu. Rozšiřuji standardní Cournotovy modely konkurence a snažím se analyzovat současný a možný budoucí vývoj po liberalizaci trhu v zemi, která má jen minimální vlastní produkci a vykazuje vysokou koncentraci v oblasti uskladňovacích služeb - klíčového vstupu při tvorbě finálního produktu. Ukazuji, že vertikálně integrované uskladňovací služby bez regulace nepřispívají k rozvoji konkurence....
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Essays on Philanthropy
Svítková, Katarína ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Bekkers, René (oponent) ; Bilodeau, Marc (oponent)
My thesis explores two aspects of philanthropy, the problem of asymmetric information between donors and the charities they support and corporate philanthropy in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The topics were inspired by real life problems observed in these countries, namely, the lack of trust in and information about nonprofit organizations and the need to inspire new, local donors to replace the disappearing foreign funding of nonprofit organizations. The first two chapters of my thesis deal with the problem of asymmetric information that arises between donors and the charities they support. I focus on one particular solution to this problem, certification, a mechanism where an independent agency evaluates the charities that voluntarily apply for certification and pay a fee. The certificate serves as a signal of quality. The first chapter, co-authored with Andreas Ortmann, addresses the question of a certifier's motivation and the welfare implications of this institution. We compare the behavior of a nonprofit and a for-profit certifier and analyze the welfare consequences in both cases. We observe that a profit-maximizing certifier is able to divert all funds from the charities to himself without providing any service to the market or increasing the welfare. The nonprofit certifier, on the...
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Anti-Corruption Mechanism in Economic Models of Corruption
Krajčová, Jana ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Frank, Bjorn (oponent) ; Spagnolo, Giancarlo (oponent)
Anti-Corruption Mechanisms in Economic Models of Corruption Jana Krajčová Abstract This dissertation consists of three chapters that, theoretically and experimentally, address the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms. In the first chapter, I analyze the effects of monitoring on an agent's incentives in a two-period principal-agent model in which the agent decides on his effort and corruptibility. The agent's type and strategy are unknown to the principal. I compare incentive-compatible wages under three different scenarios: 1) the principal does not monitor and only observes output; 2) the principal monitors the agent's effort choice; and 3) the principal monitors the agent's corruptibility. I find that monitoring of effort improves the sorting of types but it might also give the agent more incentive to be corrupt. Monitoring of corruption does not improve the sorting of types but it negatively affects the agent's incentive to be corrupt. In the second and in the third chapter I analyze experimentally how promising as anti-corruption measures leniency policies really are. Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) had conjectured, based on theoretical work, that ill-designed legal environments might, in fact, produce results that contradict the intentions of the designers of the leniency policies. And, indeed, I...
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Overconfidence in Business, Economics, Finance, and Psychology: How much of a Problem is it?
Krajč, Marian ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Hoelzl, Erik (oponent) ; Fellner, Gerlinde (oponent)
Marian Krajc Abstract The first chapter offers a theoretical model that suggests an alternative explanation to the so- called unskilled-and-unaware problem - the unskilled overestimate their skills while the skilled underestimate (but less than the unskilled). The unskilled-and-unaware problem was experimentally identified about a decade ago and numerous authors have elaborated on this problem since. We propose that the alleged unskilled-and-unaware problem, rather than being one of biased judgments, is a signal extraction problem that differs for the skilled and the unskilled. The model is based on two assumptions. First, we assume that skills are distributed according to a J-distribution, which can be regarded as an approximation of the very right tail of the IQ distribution. This assumption is reasonable given the typical subject pool used in the experimental studies of overconfidence - students from prominent US universities. Second, we assume an error term in own-ability perception, which is a common assumption in psychology models. Our simple model generates, by means of analytical computations, patterns similar to those identified in the previous experimental literature. We also discuss conditions under which the unskilled-and-unaware problem should disappear. The second chapter reports the results...
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Essays on Competition and Entrepreneurial Choice between Nonprofit and For-profit Firms
Brhlíková, Petra ; Ortmann, Andreas (vedoucí práce) ; Schlesinger, Mark (oponent) ; Handy, Femida (oponent)
In my four dissertation essays I focus on the entrepreneurial motivations to enter the nonprofit sector, the objectives of nonprofit institutions, and the competition between nonprofit and for-profit firms within an industry. The literature review looks at the nonprofit sector in a more general way, touching on its size and importance to society, its focus the characteristics that distinguish it from the for-profit sector. To motivate three theoretical chapters, I survey the literature on managerial motivations to enter the nonprofit sector, objective functions that nonprofits pursue, and mixed competition. Two theoretical essays explore competition between one nonprofit and one for-profit firm in the market for an excludable public good. The two competing firms follow different objectives and face different constraints and both optimize with respect to quality and price. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to quality. The firms' behavior in mixed competition is compared to the nonprofit duopoly and for-profit duopoly. Among other results, the model reveals that the nonprofit firm is a natural leader in the market. The for- profit firm prefers a nonprofit competitor to a for-profit one, and it is better off when its nonprofit competitor is efficient and subsidized. The robustness of these...
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