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Optimally biased expertise
Ilinov, Pavel ; Matveenko, A. ; Senkov, Maxim ; Starkov, E.
This paper shows that the principal can strictly benefit from delegating a decision to an agent whose opinion differs from that of the principal. We consider a “delegated expertise” problem in which the agent has an advantage in information acquisition relative to the principal, as opposed to having preexisting private information. When the principal is ex ante predisposed towards some action, it is optimal for her to hire an agent who is predisposed towards the same action, but to a smaller extent, since such an agent would acquire more information, which outweighs the bias stemming from misalignment. We show that belief misalignment between an agent and a principal is a viable instrument in delegation, performing on par with contracting and communication in a class of problems.
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An equivalence between rational inattention problems and complete-information conformity games
Ilinov, Pavel ; Jann, Ole
We consider two types of models: (i) a rational inattention problem (as known from the literature) and (ii) a conformity game, in which fully informed players find it costly to deviate from average behavior. We show that these problems are equivalent to each other both from the perspective of the participant and the outside observer: Each individual faces identical trade-offs in both situations, and an observer would not be able to distinguish the two models from the choice data they generate. We also establish when individual behavior in the conformity game maximizes welfare.
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Cognitive Limitations and Behavioral Biases in the Asset Pricing Context
Chavchanidze, Giorgi ; Matějka, Filip (vedoucí práce) ; Selezneva, Veronika (oponent)
Cognitive Limitations and Behavioral Biases In The Asset Pricing Context Abstrakt Giorgi Chavchanidze Zahrnuji prvky behaviorální a omezené racionality do modelu oceňování aktiv s reprezenta- tivním aktérem řešícím problém volby portfolia ve dvou obdobích Aktér modelu má zkreslená apriorní očekávání a neúplnou informaci o rozdělení budoucích stavů. Aktér utváří své pos- teriorní očekávání dle signálů, které volí ve frameworku racionální nepozornosti s diskrétní volbou vytvořeném Matějkou a Mckayem (2015). Přesnost očekávání závisí na apriorním očekávání a nákladech na získání informace λ. V případě logaritmické užitkové funkce je optimální portfolio konvexní kombinací N portfolií, která by investor volil v některém z N možných stavů, pokud by byly stavy plně pozorovatelné. Váhy konvexní kombinace před- stavují subjektivní posteriorní pravděpodobnosti stavů v čase nula. Posteriorní očekávání je dáno přehodnocením vah plynoucích z apriorního očekávání, kde váhy závisí na λ, diskontním faktoru β a relativní entropii rozdělení budoucích stavů daných rozdílnými stavy v čase nula. S použitím příkladu o dvou stavech ukazuji, jak náklady na informace a zkreslení mo- hou být společně zkoumány v popsaném frameworku a diskutuji implikované rozdíly oproti zcela racionálnímu chování. Hlavní výhodou navrženého modelu je...
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Attentional role of quota implementation
Matveenko, Andrei ; Mikhalishchev, S.
This paper introduces a new role of quotas, e.g., labor market quotas: the attentional role. We study the effect of quota implementation on the attention allocation strategy of a rationally inattentive (RI) agent. Our main result is that an RI agent who is forced to fulfill a quota never hires the candidates without acquiring information about them, unlike an unrestricted RI agent\nwho in some cases bases her decision on prior belief only. We also show that in our context quotas are equivalent to other types of affirmative policies such as subsidies and blind resume policy. We show how our results can be used to set a quota level that increases the expected value of the chosen candidate and also decreases statistical discrimination and discrimination in terms of how much attention is paid to each applicant. At the same time, quota implementation could be destructive if the social planner has imperfect information about the parameters of the model.\n
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Rational Inattention in DSGE Model
Vostřák, David ; Malovaná, Simona (vedoucí práce) ; Kopečná, Vědunka (oponent)
Velké množství dostupných informací na internetu neumožňuje nikomu je všechny zpracovat. V této práci používáme teorii racionální nepozornosti, abychom zjistili, jak se liší vnímané signály ohledně exogenních šoků pro různé úrovně informační kapacity. Tyto signály jsou poté aplikovány v modelu nové keynesiánské makroekonomie a příslušné odezvy jsou porovnány s případem neomezené pozornosti. Zjistili jsme, že pro některé autoregresivní procesy není rozdíl s případem neomezené pozornosti příliš velký, zatímco pro jiné procesy jsou rozdíly značné.
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Bayesian persuasion with costly information acquisition
Matysková, Ludmila
A sender who chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver can often influence the receiver’s subsequent actions. Is persuasion more difficult when the receiver has her own sources of information? Does the receiver benefit from having additional information sources? We consider a Bayesian persuasion model extended to a receiver’s endogenous acquisition of information under an entropy-based cost commonly used in rational inattention. A sender’s optimal signal can be computed from standard Bayesian persuasion subject to an additional constraint: the receiver never gathers her own costly information. We further determine a finite set of the sender’s signals satisfying the additional constraint in which some optimal signal must be contained. The set is characterized by linear conditions using the receiver’s utility and information cost parameters. The new method is also applicable to a standard Bayesian persuasion model and can simplify, sometimes dramatically, the search for a sender’s optimal signal (as opposed to a standard concavification technique used to solve these models). We show that the ‘threat’ of additional learning weakly decreases the sender’s expected equilibrium payoff. However, the outcome can be worse not only for the sender, but also for the receiver.\n \n
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Rational inattention to discrete choices: a new foundation for the multinomial logit model
Matějka, Filip ; McKay, A.
Often, individuals must choose among discrete alternatives with imperfect information about their values, such as selecting a job candidate, a vehicle or a university. Before choosing, they may have an opportunity to study the options, but doing so is costly. This costly information acquisition creates new choices such as the number of and types of questions to ask the job candidates. We model these situations using the tools of the rational inattention approach to information frictions (Sims, 2003).
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