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Justificatory Status of Perceptual Beliefs
Sedláková, Jana ; Kolman, Vojtěch (advisor) ; Glombíček, Petr (referee)
The main subject of this essay is the problem of the relationship between sensation and perceptual beliefs in terms of their justification. Wilfrid Sellars and his Empiricism & The Philosophie of Mind are central for this essay. Sellars criticizes the theory of fundamentalism and sense data theory by pointing to the Myth of the Given. The perceptual beliefs could not be basic and self-justifying. Such a hierarchical structure is implausible, because we need a lot of other concepts for understanding and forming the perceptual beliefs. The justification has to be placed in the space of reason, when we are able to be responsible for our beliefs, to give reason, to understand the objections and react to them. This debate is not examined only in terms of an isolated, static subject. On the contrary, this subject is embedded to a dynamic social structure. Sellars' position contains three main elements: normativity, intersubjektivity and holism. All these elements will be more closely examined and placed in a broader context. Finally, I will present a critical view on Sellars' position on the basis of three questions: 1, to what extent is plausible the prior character of "It is" talk to "It looks" talk 2, to what extent can we talk about the non - inferential beliefs 3, to what extent is Sellars'...
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Language and individuality. Some remarks on comparing Wittgenstein with Husserl and Heidegger
Beran, Ondřej ; Peregrin, Jaroslav (advisor) ; Kouba, Pavel (referee) ; Glombíček, Petr (referee)
The work compares Wittgenstein with Husserl and Heidegger (or more generally: analytical and continental philosophy), but its character is rather systematic, as it treats the question of the relation among language, intersubjectivity and individuality. Husserl and Wittgensten show that our experience of the world (world as we know it) is always our experience of the world ("the world as it is for us"), that this experience is essentially intersubjective, and that intersubjectivity is essentially linguistic. The shape of the experience of the world is not arbitrary, but it cannot be based "realistically" on the "objective" world, at most it can be founded "from inside", pragmatically. The primarily pragmatic nature of our experience allows its variation (a plausible form of relativism), and on the other hand it makes it problematic to try to set the purpose of the experience beyond its limits (an absolute teleology of history). It is also shown that Husserl's conception, setting the non-linguistic life of the consciousness "before" language and individual subjectivity "before" intersubjectivity, faces certain problems, or that we cannot conceive phenomena of thought (psychic life) and individuality, as we usually understand them, this way. Heidegger agrees with Wittgenstein in the point that language is...
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René Descartes - the human good as a onto-theology
Zika, Richard ; Sobotka, Milan (advisor) ; Hill, James (referee) ; Glombíček, Petr (referee)
At the beginning of Descartes's Regulae ad directionem ingenii we can find a call for secure knowledge which should be the point of departure for all meaningful human activities. The idea of secure knowledge is here gradually taking the form of universa} wisdom or 'good minď (i.e. rationality), of method and mathesis universalis, of a doctrine of arrangement and measurement. An example of manifestation of rationality (and, hence, activity) of Cartesian knowledge i s the rejection of Aristotelian-scholastic idea of the order of categories of entia as a speciously self-evident, immediately given clue to guide the cognitive process. In this context the rejection has also involved the notion of substance as a given absolute and that of accidentals, relative to it ('respecting' it). The old ontology does, however, assert itself in Descartes's method: the 'good minď acquiring knowledge becomes the 'substance' of the world as being acquired knowledge of; all objects of knowledge, and, as such, of arrangement, 'respecť it, are 'accidental' to it. Nevertheless the 'good minď acquiring knowledge (making arrangements) is, in its activity, not only the 'substance' (ousía) of the world as being acquired knowledge of but, in unity with this, also its principle, arkhé, cause. The Cartesian method is therefore not only...
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