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Essays in Strategic Information Provision
 Senkov, Maxim ; Zápal, Jan (advisor) ; Ivanov, Maxim (referee) ; Matysková, Ludmila (referee)
In the first chapter, we show that a biased principal can strictly benefit from hiring an agent with misaligned preferences or beliefs. We consider a ``delegated expertise'' problem in which the agent has an advantage in acquiring information relative to the principal. We show that it is optimal for a principal who is ex ante biased towards one action to select an agent who is less biased. Such an agent is more uncertain ex ante about what the best course of action is and would acquire more information. The benefit to the principal of a better-informed decision always outweighs the cost of a small misalignment. In the second chapter, I study a game between an agent and a principal in a dynamic information design framework. A principal funds a multistage project and retains the right to cut the funding if it stagnates at some point. An agent wants to convince the principal to fund the project as long as possible, and can design the flow of information about the progress of the project in order to persuade the principal. If the project is sufficiently promising ex ante, then the agent commits to providing only the good news that the project is accomplished. If the project is not promising enough ex ante, the agent persuades the principal to start the funding by committing to provide not only good...
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