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Hare's thesis as a logical and philosophical problem
Luhan, Martin ; Svoboda, Vladimír (advisor) ; Marvan, Tomáš (referee)
Title: Hare's thesis as a logical and philosophical problem Author: Martin Luhan Department: Department of Logic Supervisor: PhDr. Vladimír Svoboda, CSc. Abstract: The present work is aiming to analyse the problem of inferring from impe- rative premisses to an indicative conclusion which goes by the name Hare's Thesis. The logical analysis of the language of morals was the basis of Richard M. Hare's ethical studies. Therefore a brief presentation of his philosophy is given followed by a detailed walkthrough of his way of dealing with impera- tives. Hare states that logic should be interested in dealing with prescriptive sentences. The paper also presents a selection of some of the semantics of logic of imperatives and some of their fundamental problems. Based on this we finally analyse whether the Hare's Thesis which forbids inferring from im- perative premisses to indicative conclusions is acceptable. And we conclude that in most cases it is reasonable to reject it. Keywords: Logic of imperatives, Hare's Thesis, deontic logic, metaethics
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Galen Strawson's impossibility of (moral) responsibility
EDL, Tomáš
In this thesis I attempt to introduce Galen Strawson's position, which he adopts in the free will debate followed by the debate about his Basic Argument. While giving a de-tailed account of responsibility as a reflective rational responsiveness, I show that re-sponsibility is in no respect causa sui and therefore it is not impossible for human beings to reach it, explained with the reasons given by Strawson. I refuse steps B, C, 8, 9 and 10 of the Basic Argument. I claim that undetermined self-determination consists in the ability to make a decision in the light of actually revised principles of choice. Such revision is granted by actual ability to reflect the validity and adequacy of principles of choice in relation to motivating values in question by using methodical doubt as a universal tool do to so. Such reflection, with respect to what matters for decision making in question, is potentially ultimate. I claim that Strawson underestimates the uniqueness of reflective rationality especially, when missing the crucial difference between Fido the dog and Nemo the man in the situation of choice. Moreover, I suspect Strawson of excluding the subject of action or choice and its actual principles of choice from the realm of intelligible things. This leads to disruption of request to conception of the world as internally consistent and in principle attainable by human beings. Finally, I show why I find sophisticated fatalism problematic in both of its versions, deterministic as well as indeterministic.
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Hare's thesis as a logical and philosophical problem
Luhan, Martin ; Svoboda, Vladimír (advisor) ; Marvan, Tomáš (referee)
Title: Hare's thesis as a logical and philosophical problem Author: Martin Luhan Department: Department of Logic Supervisor: PhDr. Vladimír Svoboda, CSc. Abstract: The present work is aiming to analyse the problem of inferring from impe- rative premisses to an indicative conclusion which goes by the name Hare's Thesis. The logical analysis of the language of morals was the basis of Richard M. Hare's ethical studies. Therefore a brief presentation of his philosophy is given followed by a detailed walkthrough of his way of dealing with impera- tives. Hare states that logic should be interested in dealing with prescriptive sentences. The paper also presents a selection of some of the semantics of logic of imperatives and some of their fundamental problems. Based on this we finally analyse whether the Hare's Thesis which forbids inferring from im- perative premisses to indicative conclusions is acceptable. And we conclude that in most cases it is reasonable to reject it. Keywords: Logic of imperatives, Hare's Thesis, deontic logic, metaethics
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