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Merger regulation of killer acquisitions under European competition law in European and international comparison
Jakob, Sebastian ; Šmejkal, Václav (advisor) ; Svobodová, Magdaléna (referee)
1 English abstract Merger regulation of killer acquisitions under European competition law in European and international comparison Collen Cunningham, along with her colleagues, introduced a novel theory of harm known as a "killer acquisition" in her paper titled "Killer Acquisitions." A killer acquisition involves an already well-established market player acquiring a potential competitor with the intent to discontinue the acquired innovation project. The primary objective of such an acquisition is to eliminate potential competition that might arise from the innovative project of the acquired competitor. Typically, the potential targets of such scenarios are innovative start-ups that do not generate sufficient turnover to trigger the notification threshold employed in the EU, which relies solely on the turnover of merging parties. As a result, the European Commission sought other ways to assert jurisdiction over such transactions, most notably through the utilization of Article 22 of the Merger Regulation. However, it is argued that the current system of merger control at the European level is not bulletproof and a potential enforcement gap necessitating an amendment of the Merger Regulation exists. Consequently, several alternative criteria have been analysed, namely, the market-share test used in Spain...
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