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The evolution of conception of truth from the presocratics to Plato and its meaning in the history from the perspective of Martin Heidegger
Štěrba, Vojtěch ; Pětová, Marie (advisor) ; Benyovszky, Ladislav (referee)
The thesis is based on Heidegger's conception of truth that was forming in his thinking from the beginning of the thirties of 20th Century. We follow the change of the conception of truth in history from Heidegger's perspective, namely on Anaximandros, Parmenides and Plato. We look upon this subject through chosen Heidegger's texts concerning presocratics and truth, along with Plato's dialog Parmenides and an anonymous commentary to it from an unknown author from the late antiquity. For Heidegger the way of Being of a man is changing in history, based on the transformation of mans relation to Being. The relation is linked with a transformation of the conception of truth. The way how we uncover the beings in the world and what does the being mean to us is connected to that too. That is why we can say that in the way how we understand the truth is equally shown how we understand ourselves and the world. We are therefore looking on the conception of truth through Heidegger's concept of history, which is according to him rooted in the transformation of one's relation to Being itself. That affects not only how and from what a man understands himself in the world (and therefore affects the transformation of the conception of truth throughout history), but also whether and how a man asks about the Being...
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Plato's Parmenides from a logical point of view
Nalevajková, Nikola ; Vlasáková, Marta (advisor) ; Dostálová, Ludmila (referee)
The main subject of my thesis is the so called "Third Man Argument". It is an objection, which appeared already during Plato's life and was raised against Plato's Theory of forms. As a reaction to this argument, Plato wrote the dialogue Parmenides, to formulate it explicitly, together with other objections which attacked his forms that time as well. After study of the dialogue itself follows a part devoted to three different attitudes to the issue of Third Man Argument, namely by G. Vlastos, E. N. Zalta and F.J. Pelletier and at last by M. S. Cohen. On Last pages are mentioned attitudes, which see Forms as universals and sets.
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