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Determinants of Executive Compensation in Czech Companies
Keše, Tibor ; Geršl, Adam (advisor) ; Klinger, Tomáš (referee)
In this thesis we assess executive compensation in the Czech Republic. Our study adds to scarce literature written on this topic regarding the Czech environment. We analyze a dataset of 100 large Czech companies, we try to find the factors influencing income of Czech managers and we compare our results to existing empirical research. We found that factors such as company's size, performance or concentration and nature of ownership are determinants of the level of executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that annual growth in managerial income is to some extent sensitive to annual performance of the company. We conclude that the environment of executive compensation in the Czech Republic fits predictions of both underlying theories, optimal contracting and rent extraction view, and the compensation culture seems comparable to other countries. JEL Classification J31, M52, L25 Keywords Executive compensation, optimal contracting, rent extraction, performance sensitivity
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Executive Compensation in Firms Producing Addictive Goods
Janský, Michael ; Novák, Jiří (advisor) ; Babin, Adrian (referee)
Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies Title Page MASTER'S THESIS Executive Compensation in Firms Producing Addictive Goods Author: Bc. Michael Janský Supervisor: Jiří Novák, M.Sc., Ph.D. Academic Year: 2014/2015 Abstract This thesis investigates executive compensation, turnover and migration patterns in firms that produce addictive goods (tobacco, alcohol, and gambling). Previous research has identified costs associated with the production of harmful goods specific to these industries. Consistent with this stream of research, I find increased executive compensation in tobacco, alcohol, and gambling firms. This finding seems to be driven by industry specific characteristics, rather than by executives' traits or by the 'traditional' determinants of executive compensation. Executive migration patterns and the effect of job change on compensation indicate that the higher compensation is not caused by executives' attributes well suited for these firms' specific needs, by executives' contribution to value-creating activities, or by other executive-specific characteristics. Rather, the higher compensation seems to reflect a payment to executives for having to bear society's aversion to or displeasure with these harmful goods, and those who produce them. JEL...
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Determinants of Executive Compensation in Czech Companies
Keše, Tibor ; Geršl, Adam (advisor) ; Klinger, Tomáš (referee)
In this thesis we assess executive compensation in the Czech Republic. Our study adds to scarce literature written on this topic regarding the Czech environment. We analyze a dataset of 100 large Czech companies, we try to find the factors influencing income of Czech managers and we compare our results to existing empirical research. We found that factors such as company's size, performance or concentration and nature of ownership are determinants of the level of executive compensation. Furthermore, we find that annual growth in managerial income is to some extent sensitive to annual performance of the company. We conclude that the environment of executive compensation in the Czech Republic fits predictions of both underlying theories, optimal contracting and rent extraction view, and the compensation culture seems comparable to other countries. JEL Classification J31, M52, L25 Keywords Executive compensation, optimal contracting, rent extraction, performance sensitivity
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Relationship between Executive Compensation and Bank Performance of TARP Recipients
Zamrazilová, Marta ; Janský, Petr (advisor) ; Novák, Jiří (referee)
The objective of this diploma thesis is to examine the relationship between executive compensation and bank performance. We study the executive pay structure of the U.S. largest 100 bank holding companies during period 2002-2009. Our data analysis describes differences between behaviour of TARP recipients and the banks that did not receive state financial help with consideration of financial crisis effect. We use econometric model to test the dependence of bank performance measures and particular elements of executive remuneration - total sum, bonus, stock award and option award. The relationship is generally considered as weak, but we also find linkage between TARP recipients' compensation and Market Capitalisation and on the other hand non-TARP bank appeared to define compensation according to earning per share. A special attention is devoted to executive remuneration structures of TARP recipients with weakest results and their comparison with Dodd-Frank Financial Reform Act and TARP standards. JEL Classification: G21, G35, G38, K23 Keywords: Executive compensation, bank performance, Troubled Asset Relief Program, performance-related pay, corporate governance, financial crisis, executives
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